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CHOOSING WHICH RULE TO BREAK FIRST:
AN IN-HOUSE ATTORNEY WHISTLEBLOWER’S
CHOICES AFTER DISCOVERING A POSSIBLE
FEDERAL SECURITIES LAW VIOLATION
Naseem Faqihi*
The early twenty-first century has seen several instances of large-scale
federal securities law violations—such as Enron, WorldCom, and the
Bernie Madoff scandal—that have garnered widespread attention and
heavily impacted the global economy.
In each of these cases,
whistleblowers tried to expose the underlying fraud. These and other
scandals led to the enactment of new laws to protect whistleblowers who
seek to expose these kinds of violations.
In-house attorneys are in a special position to discover, understand, and
expose their organization’s federal securities violations. However, should
in-house attorneys discover misconduct, and when deciding whether or not
to take action, they must take into account several different and potentially
conflicting governing regimes. As whistleblowers, they can be subject to
various state and federal laws, each of which will require them to respond
differently in order to be protected from retaliation. These laws have also
been interpreted in different ways by different courts. As attorneys, they
are subject to state rules of professional conduct, and perhaps other rules
governing professional conduct under federal law. As in-house attorneys,
they may face additional restrictions, since their employer is also their
client. These different regimes can permit or even require attorneys to take
conflicting actions in any given situation, making it potentially difficult for
an attorney to act without breaking at least one rule or law.
This Note argues that in-house attorney whistleblowers should be
expected to act in the same way across different governing regimes. Inhouse attorneys should be required to report federal securities violations
internally first and be permitted to report externally thereafter if the
violation is not resolved.

* J.D. Candidate, 2015, Fordham University School of Law; B.A., 2009, American
University in Dubai. Many thanks to Professor James J. Brudney for his insight and
guidance. I also thank my family and friends for their endless love, encouragement, and
patience.
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INTRODUCTION
Imagine for a moment that you are the in-house counsel at a publicly
traded corporation, and you have just discovered that your employer is
involved in a potentially massive violation of federal securities law. You
are aware that others have been in this position before, and that their next
steps have been scrutinized closely, discussed publicly, and linked to some
of the largest financial scandals in history. Ethically, what is the next step
you should take? Should you alert someone within the organization, or will
this lead to a cover-up? How can you act without violating the attorneyclient privilege? Legally, what steps can you take to ensure that you are
protected from retaliation? Even further, what steps should you take to
avoid sanctions? Should you become a whistleblower?
On October 1, 2013, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) announced an award of more than $14 million to an anonymous,
individual whistleblower.1 This is the largest award that the Commission
has made since the 2011 establishment of its whistleblower program, the
Office of the Whistleblower (OW).2 The OW was created pursuant to the
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act3 (the DoddFrank Act). The OW rewards whistleblowers who provide original
information leading to a successful SEC enforcement action of more than
$1 million in sanctions with between 10 percent to 30 percent of the money
collected.4 Prior to this award, the OW had only made two others: one in
the amount of $50,000 in August 2012 and one in the amount of $125,000
in August 2013.5 These awards pale in comparison to the one most recently
1. Press Release, SEC, SEC Awards More Than $14 Million to Whistleblower (Oct. 1,
2013), available at http://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/1370539
854258#.UoYfjo0mwl0.
2. Id.
3. Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of the 7, 12, 15, 18, 22, 31, 42 U.S.C.); see also Press Release, supra note 1.
4. See Press Release, supra note 1.
5. Id.

3344

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 82

announced, most obviously in the size of the award, but also in terms of the
potential long-term public impact, which the first two awards seemed to
have very little.6
In the announcement, SEC Chair Mary Jo White stated that the
Commission hopes that the award will encourage those with information to
come forward.7 At the whistleblower’s request, the SEC has kept many
details around the most recent award private.8 Since the program rewards
whistleblowers with between 10 to 30 percent of total money collected,
however, it is possible to deduce that the total sanctions in this case were at
least $47 million.9 Although this has been the OW’s largest award yet,10
the underlying large-scale federal securities violation is by no means a
recent phenomenon: the Dodd-Frank Act, which established the OW, was
enacted partly in response to one of the most infamous federal securities
violations in recent history, the Bernie Madoff Ponzi scheme.11 In 2009,
Madoff pleaded guilty to eleven felony counts and was imprisoned for a
maximum sentence of 150 years12 for managing a global Ponzi scheme that
prosecutors valued at more than $64.8 billion.13
One of the most controversial issues surrounding the Madoff case was
that a whistleblower, Harry Markopolos, repeatedly tried to bring the fraud
to the SEC’s attention for nine years and was continuously ignored.14 In his
subsequent testimony in front of the House Financial Services Committee,
Markopolos accused the SEC of “investigative ineptitude” and “financial
illiteracy.”15 His book16 revealed the extent of his desperation and
frustration with the situation: Markopolos had even considered the

6. SEC Issues First Large Award in Whistleblower Program, CLIENT ALERT (Latham &
Watkins LLP, New York, N.Y.), Oct. 2, 2013, at 2, available at http://www.lw.com/
thoughtLeadership/lw-sec-first-large-whistleblower-award (“Will this award inspire many
more would-be whistleblowers to contact the SEC in hopes of getting rich? That remains to
be seen. But Congress and the Commission have already bet that the answer will be yes.”).
7. Press Release, supra note 1.
8. SEC Issues First Large Award in Whistleblower Program, supra note 6, at 1.
9. Id.
10. See supra notes 1–2 and accompanying text.
11. See, e.g., Chris W. Haaf & Monica C. Platt, 2011 Sees Focus on Whistleblowing and
Dodd-Frank Claims, BUS. L. TODAY, Jan. 2012, at 1, 1.
12. United States v. Madoff, No. 09 Crim. 213(DC), 2009 WL 3347945 (S.D.N.Y. Oct.
13, 2009).
13. Martha Graybow, Madoff Mysteries Remain As He Nears Guilty Plea, REUTERS
(Mar. 11, 2009, 4:35 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/03/11/us-madoffidUSTRE52A5JK20090311?pageNumber=2&virtualBrandChannel=0&sp=true. The fraud
was later valued lower at $13 billion, according to court documents related to Madoff’s
sentencing. See Madoff Gets 150 Years; Loss Now at $13 Billion, ANDREWS BANKR. LITIG.
REP., Aug. 7, 2009, at 6, 6.
14. Robert Chew, A Madoff Whistle-Blower Tells His Story, TIME (Feb. 9, 2009),
http://content.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,1877181,00.html.
15. Id.
16. Madoff Whistle-Blower Slams S.E.C. in New Book, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK, (Feb. 26,
2010, 7:30 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/02/26/madoff-whistle-blower-slams-s-ec-in-new-book/?_r=0.
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possibility of killing Madoff, if personally threatened.17 It was in the wake
of this scandal, among others, that the Dodd-Frank Act was enacted to
expand on the previously existing antiretaliation protections and monetary
incentives afforded to whistleblowers who expose securities fraud.18 The
OW received 3,001 tips and complaints from all fifty states in 2012, its first
full fiscal year of operation.19
Against this background of large-scale financial fraud and
whistleblowing scandals, in-house attorneys may be forced to navigate a
complex web of governing regimes when deciding whether or not to
become whistleblowers.20 Due to the nature of their profession, in-house
counsel may be more likely to uncover federal securities violations.21
However, attorneys may be subject to other standards, such as attorneyclient confidentiality and may be expected to act differently than other
whistleblowers.22 In-house attorneys, in particular, must consider that their
employer is also their client.23
This Note examines the choices available to in-house attorneys who
suspect that their employer is violating federal securities law and must
decide whether to report the misconduct, and, if so, whether to do so
internally or externally. The Note explores the different choices in-house
attorneys can make to protect themselves against retaliation and avoid
sanctions.
Part I of this Note provides a general background to the relevant law,
beginning with a discussion of who whistleblowers are, whether or not they
should be protected, and how they can be protected. Next, Part I provides
some of the main federal and state laws that protect whistleblowers and the
special considerations in-house attorney whistleblowers may face.
Part II addresses the main conflicts that arise due to the sometimes
conflicting regimes described in Part I and the resulting issues that in-house
attorneys face when they become whistleblowers: whether reports should
be made internally or externally and determining which law applies.24
17. Id. (“If he contacted me and threatened me, I was going to drive down to New York
and take him out. . . . The government would have forced me into it by failing to do its job,
and failing to protect me. In that situation I felt I had no other options. I was going to kill
him.”).
18. See infra notes 107–14 and accompanying text.
19. SEC, ANNUAL REPORT ON THE DODD-FRANK WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM, FISCAL
YEAR 2012, at 4–5 (2012) available at http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/owb/annual-report2012.pdf.
20. See infra Part I.D.
21. See infra notes 209–84 and accompanying text.
22. See infra Part I.D.2.
23. See infra notes 285–93 and accompanying text.
24. The extraterritorial applications of these laws, and the additional complexities
arising from conflicts with foreign laws, are beyond the scope of this Note. For a discussion
of the extraterritorial application of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, see Ian L. Schaffer, An
International Train Wreck Caused in Part by a Defective Whistle: When the Extraterritorial
Application of SOX Conflicts with Foreign Laws, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1829 (2006). For a
discussion of the extraterritorial application of the Dodd-Frank Act, see Nicole H. Sprinzen,
Asadi v. GE Energy (USA) L.L.C.: A Case Study of the Limits of Dodd-Frank Anti-
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Additionally, Part II expands on the hypothetical scenario introduced above
to demonstrate the difficulties attorney whistleblowers may face in
navigating different laws.
Part III of the Note proposes that in-house attorneys should be held to a
uniform standard under the various regimes that apply to them. This Part
recommends that in-house attorneys should be required to report federal
securities violations internally first and permitted to disclose information
externally if there is no resolution.
I. ATTORNEY WHISTLEBLOWERS, THE LAWS THAT PROTECT THEM,
AND THE LAWS THAT DO NOT
Part I of this Note begins with a discussion of who whistleblowers are,
whether or not they should be protected, and how they can be protected.
This is followed with a background of some of the main federal laws
protecting whistleblowers. Because even whistleblowers who disclose
federal securities violations can be protected under certain state laws, these
state laws are discussed in subsequent sections. Finally, this Part explores
how the laws apply to in-house attorneys and discusses the special factors
that they must consider.
A. Whistleblowers: Who Are They, Should We Protect Them,
and How Do We Go About It?
Part I.A provides an overview of who whistleblowers are, the different
reasons for protecting them, and the different mechanisms for these
protections.
1. Who Are Whistleblowers?
The term “whistleblower” is often credited to consumer activist Ralph
Nader, who is said to have coined the term in the early 1970s.25 Others
have said that the term originates from police officers blowing their
whistles to warn onlookers about illegal activity.26 The U.S. Supreme
Court first used the term—somewhat dismissively—in 1983, referring to
“so-called whistleblowers.”27 While the term may be more commonly used
today, in order to discuss whistleblowers and the scope of protection that is
afforded to them, it is helpful to first define who they are.
retaliation Protections and the Impact on Corporate Compliance Objectives, 51 AM. CRIM.
L. REV. 151 (2014).
25. Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, Four Signal Moments in Whistleblower Law: 1983–
2013, 30 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 389, 389 (2013) (citing WHISTLE BLOWING: THE
REPORT OF THE CONFERENCE ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (Ralph Nader et al. eds.,
1972), but acknowledging that other sources have identified earlier uses of the term).
26. Geneva Campbell, Snitch or Savior? How the Modern Cultural Acceptance of
Pharmaceutical Company Employee External Whistleblowing is Reflected in Dodd-Frank
and the Affordable Care Act, 15 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 565, 568 (2013).
27. Rapp, supra note 25, at 389–90 (citing Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 385 n.25
(1983)).
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There is no single, universally accepted definition of a whistleblower.28
Black’s Law Dictionary defines a whistleblower as “an employee who
reports employer wrongdoing to a governmental or law-enforcement
agency.”29 The New Oxford American Dictionary, on the other hand,
defines the term more broadly as “a person who informs on someone
engaged in an illicit activity.”30 Some definitions are even broader,
categorizing “any employee who ‘opposes’ the conduct, actions, or
decisions of his or her employer” as a whistleblower.31 However, a
definition this broad is not very useful for the purposes of this Note,
because it could include any employee who expresses discontent—or even
just disagrees—with his or her employer.32
For the purposes of this Note, a whistleblower is defined as an employee
who discloses information relating to a potential violation of the law by his
or her employer, to parties that are either internal or external to the
organization, for the purpose of preventing the wrongdoing.33 This
definition is useful for the scope of this Note, which addresses the issues
faced by in-house counsel whose employers may have violated federal
securities laws and who must decide whether or not to disclose information
either internally or externally. The definition includes these in-house
attorneys, while being broad enough to also include other whistleblowers
who may face similar issues and whose experiences are discussed in this
Note.34
2. Should We Protect Whistleblowers?
An understanding of a whistleblower’s motivations may help shape a
discussion of whether—and how—a whistleblower should be protected and
perhaps even incentivized for his or her actions. Before exploring the
different arguments for protecting and incentivizing whistleblowers, this
section explores the different motives that whistleblowers may have for
their actions.

28. Peter D. Banick, Case Note, The “In-House” Whistleblower: Walking the Line
Between “Good Cop, Bad Cop,” 37 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1868, 1872 (2011).
29. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1734 (9th ed. 2009).
30. NEW OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY 1971 (3d ed. 2010).
31. Banick, supra note 28, at 1871 (citing Jonathan W.J. Armour, Who’s Afraid of the
Big, Bad Whistle?: Minnesota’s Recent Trend Toward Limiting Employer Liability Under
the Whistleblower Statute, 19 HAMLINE L. REV. 107, 109 n.13 (1995)).
32. Id. at 1871 n.17 (“The word ‘oppose’ is so open and ambiguous in this context that it
could arguably include employees who simply express discontent to their co-workers or any
other person regarding their employer—or, even employees who internally disagree with
their employers but never show any objective manifestation of their dissent.”).
33. Id. at 1873. Here, the “purpose” of preventing wrongdoing means that the ultimate
goal is to make the wrongdoing known to another party and does not refer to any personal
motives for blowing the whistle. Id. at 1873 n.24.
34. The famed whistleblowers discussed in this section were not in-house lawyers.
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a. What Incentivizes Whistleblowers?
Research shows that there are many different factors that motivate
whistleblowers and that these factors may vary depending on context.35
Generally speaking, motivations can be grouped into two categories:
intrinsic or extrinsic.36 Extrinsic motivation is linked to behavior that is
motivated by external factors such as rewards and payments. Intrinsic
motivation is driven by an individual’s sense of moral or civic duty.37 For
example, whistleblowers may perceive the wrongdoing to run counter to the
organization’s stated goals, “the purposes society has for its business
sector,” or their own moral standards.38
Whether a whistleblower is motivated by intrinsic or extrinsic factors
may depend on the context; for example, one experimental study has shown
that monetary rewards can frequently affect the level of reporting, unless
the underlying violation is perceived as morally offensive.39 Thus,
according to the study, when the whistleblower attaches an ethical
significance to the act of reporting, monetary rewards are not consequential
in determining his or her actions.40 On the other hand, in the absence of a
perceived moral issue, monetary rewards were shown to be decisive.41
Interestingly, in these situations, rewards of small monetary value—
compared to the absence of any reward at all—seemed to discourage
reporting.42 This phenomenon may be attributed to a “crowding-out
effect,”43 whereby the introduction of an external factor such as a reward
may dampen the intrinsic motivations of those who would report
wrongdoing without it.44
35. Dave Ebersole, Blowing the Whistle on the Dodd-Frank Whistleblower Provisions, 6
OHIO ST. ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 123, 124 (2011) (citing Yuval Feldman & Orly Lobel,
The Incentives Matrix: The Comparative Effectiveness of Rewards, Liabilities, Duties, and
Protections for Reporting Illegality, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1151 (2010)); see also Campbell, supra
note 26, at 569 (“[E]mployees frequently have mixed motives for reporting wrongdoing.”).
36. Feldman & Lobel, supra note 35, at 1178.
37. Id. There is ongoing debate about the relationship between intrinsic and extrinsic
motivation. While some studies suggest that extrinsic factors—such as rewards—can
undermine intrinsic motivation, others show that the two types of motivation can reinforce
each other. Some literature suggests that when people attribute their own behavior to
extrinsic factors or rewards, they discount their own intrinsic motivations for the behavior
and thereby undermine the perceived effect of intrinsic factors. Id. at 1178–79.
38. Campbell, supra note 26, at 569–70 (quoting JACK BEHRMAN, ESSAYS ON ETHICS IN
BUSINESS AND THE PROFESSIONS 140 (1998)).
39. Feldman & Lobel, supra note 35, at 1202.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. David Freeman Engstrom, Whither Whistleblowing? Bounty Regimes, Regulatory
Context, and the Challenge of Optimal Design, 15 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. (forthcoming
2014), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2341808. Studies
have shown that people may discount the intrinsic motivations for their behavior when
extrinsic factors are introduced. See supra note 37; see also Feldman & Lobel, supra note
35, at 1181 n.190 (citing Bruno S. Frey & Alois Stutzer, Environmental Morale and
Motivation 14–16 (Univ. of Zurich Inst. for Empirical Research in Econ., Working Paper

2014]

CHOOSING WHICH RULE TO BREAK FIRST

3349

A whistleblower can also be motivated by how they think others will
act.45 For example, if there is a monetary reward, the whistleblower may
suspect that others will also come forward and may behave strategically to
be the first to collect the reward.46 However, potential whistleblowers may
not necessarily be able to predict others’ actions accurately: experiments
have shown that individuals perceive themselves as more motivated by
intrinsic, ethical factors than other individuals.47
Differing motivations may affect whether a whistleblower reports
wrongdoing internally or externally.48 For example, if employees are
concerned about their colleagues’ wrongdoing, they may opt to make
internal reports.49 On the other hand, if they are motivated by a desire to
protect the public welfare or to stop a large-scale violation that the whole
company is involved in, they may choose to report to external parties.50
Whistleblowers must also make their decisions about whether to report
wrongdoing in light of substantial disincentives to refrain from acting: “[i]t
is difficult emotionally, personally, intellectually and professionally to
come forward and blow the whistle on one’s employer, colleagues and
friends.”51 Empirical evidence has shown that whistleblowers can suffer
psychological, professional, and even physical harm as a result of their
disclosures.52
Potential whistleblowers may be reluctant to act because of a strong fear
of social ostracism.53 This can range from receiving the “cold shoulder” or
“silent treatment” from colleagues to full-blown social rejection.54
Whistleblowers may find themselves excluded from emails, offices memos,
and other communications,55 and are often viewed as “problem

No. 288, 2006), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=900370)
(noting that these situations result in the negative effect of eliminating intrinsic motivations
while not introducing sufficiently strong incentives to achieve the desired behavior through
extrinsic motivation).
45. Feldman & Lobel, supra note 35, at 1203.
46. Id.
47. Id. “These findings are generally in line with the psychological holier-than-thou
effect—the general belief of individuals that they themselves are more ethically driven than
others.” Id.
48. Campbell, supra note 26, at 570.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, Beyond Protection: Invigorating Incentives for
Sarbanes-Oxley Corporate and Securities Fraud Whistleblowers, 87 B.U. L. REV. 91, 118
(2007) (quoting Pamela H. Bucy, Private Justice, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 61 (2002)).
52. Elizabeth C. Tippett, The Promise of Compelled Whistleblowing: What the
Corporate Governance Provisions of Sarbanes Oxley Mean for Employment Law, 11 EMP.
RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 1, 16 (2007).
53. Rapp, supra note 51, at 120. “A century ago, William James wrote that ‘[n]o more
fiendish punishment could be devised’ than social ostracism. Ostracism threatens a basic
human motivation to avoid exclusion from important social groups.” Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 120–21.
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employees.”56 These forms of ostracism can have a strong psychological
and even physical impact on a whistleblower.57 Psychologically,
aside
from the effects stemming from social ostracism, whistleblowers can suffer
from “nagging doubts that their suspicions are not justified and that they
may be, or may be perceived as, ‘crazy.’”58 Many whistleblower cases can
drag on for years, during which time the psychological strains and doubts
experienced by both the whistleblower and those closest to him or her can
have severe consequences, leading many whistleblowers to lose their
families.59
Professionally, even with antiretaliation protections, whistleblowers can
find themselves without a job, since a revelation of serious fraud can
destroy the corporation they work for.60 Moreover, even if whistleblowers
do not continue working for their employer, they may fear being blacklisted
by the industry that they work in.61 Whistleblowers commonly fear that
they will be “boycotted” by companies—even an entire industry—and that
they will have to “live their lives in misery, shunned by employers.”62
Thus, whistleblowers “often face the difficult choice between telling the
truth and the risk of committing ‘career suicide.’”63 Those who rank higher
in the managerial hierarchy may be more sensitive to the risk of being
blacklisted, since they are more likely to have industry-specific skills.64
This can significantly affect the amount and quality of information that is
revealed, since higher-ranking employees tend to have a wider view of the
organization and are likely to have better information about wrongdoing.65
Interestingly, the social and professional stigmas that a whistleblower
may face vary depending on the perceived motivations behind the
whistleblower’s actions.66 Whistleblowers acting in response to a duty to
report can be viewed in a better light than those who act—or are perceived
to act—in response to a monetary reward.67 One experimental study has
shown that even when the potential rewards are low, and even when they
are combined with a duty to report, whistleblowers receive low levels of
social respect and appreciation.68 Conversely, when there is no monetary
reward, whistleblowers seem to draw consistently higher levels of social
56. John Ashcroft et al., Whistleblowers Cash In, Unwary Corporations Pay, 40
HOFSTRA L. REV. 367, 407 (2011).
57. Rapp, supra note 51, at 121.
58. Id. at 123 (quoting ROBIN PAGE WEST, ADVISING THE QUI TAM WHISTLEBLOWER:
FROM IDENTIFYING A CASE TO FILING UNDER THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT 30 (2001)).
59. Id.
60. Id. at 119.
61. Id. at 124. While antiretaliation protections can help whistleblowers keep their jobs
with their original employers, future employers may discriminate against them. Id.
62. Id.
63. S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 111 (2010).
64. Engstrom, supra note 44.
65. Id.
66. Feldman & Lobel, supra note 35, at 1205.
67. Id.
68. Id.

2014]

CHOOSING WHICH RULE TO BREAK FIRST

3351

admiration.69 Thus, whistleblowers’ perceived motivation can affect
whether they are praised or stigmatized for their actions, and this perceived
motivation is in turn affected by how whistleblowers are incentivized.70
Because of these different societal responses, whistleblowers may
experience a range of consequences as a result of their actions. The next
section explores the different ways in which society views and portrays
whistleblowers, and how this ultimately shapes their experiences.
b. The Whistleblower Experience:
From Rats and Snitches to Persons of the Year
This section explores varying societal attitudes toward whistleblowers
and how they affect their overall experience. Additionally, this section
examines the experiences of several high-profile whistleblowers in recent
history. As discussed below, these individuals have been instrumental in
changing the legal—and perhaps also the societal—treatment of
whistleblowers.
In the past, whistleblowers have been portrayed negatively, even as
“lowlife[s] who betray[] a sacred trust largely for personal gain.”71 This
view seems to have shifted to the opposite extreme in recent years:
whistleblowers are now often portrayed in the media as taking heroic steps
that may potentially stop corrupt practices.72 The change in society’s
portrayal of whistleblowers may correspond to the passage of corporate
laws and regulations that “express a decidedly moral view of
whistleblowers as allies in the fight against corporate fraud, bribery, and
corruption.”73 Historically, policymakers openly viewed and referred to
whistleblowers in negative, derogatory terms, calling them “rat[s]” and
“snitches.”74 For example, in a 1998 congressional debate about the
Internal Revenue Service’s whistleblower program, one senator called it the
“Snitch Program” and the “Reward for Rats Program.”75 A former Reagan
Administration official who was in charge of the federal whistleblower
program referred to whistleblowers as “malcontents.”76
In light of this poor view of whistleblowers, it is not surprising that their
disclosures were viewed negatively: one prominent example is the
response to A. Ernest Fitgerald’s disclosures.77
Fitzgerald was a
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 1159 (alteration in original) (quoting TERANCE D. MIETHE, WHISTLEBLOWING
AT WORK: TOUGH CHOICES IN EXPOSING FRAUD, WASTE, AND ABUSE ON THE JOB 12 (1999).
72. Id.
73. Matt A. Vega, Beyond Incentives: Making Corporate Whistleblowing Moral in the
New Era of Dodd-Frank Act “Bounty Hunting,” 45 CONN. L. REV. 483, 490 (2012).
74. Id. at 491 (alteration in original).
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. See Jocelyn Patricia Bond, Efficiency Considerations and the Use of Taxpayer
Resources: An Analysis of Proposed Whistleblower Protection Act Revisions, 19 FED. CIR.
B.J. 107, 107 (2009).
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management analyst with the Department of the Air Force78 and made
history in 1968 by testifying before the Joint Economic Committee
regarding the Pentagon’s $2 billion cost overruns on an aircraft program.79
As a federal government employee, his public disclosures regarding
government inefficiency were considered unthinkable at the time.80
Although Fitzgerald was later hailed as “the father of all whistleblowers”
for his courageous efforts in protecting American taxpayers, his initial
experience was very different: “he was branded as disloyal to his country,
lost his job, and sparked a firestorm of media and Congressional
attention.”81
When President Richard Nixon was questioned about Fitzgerald’s
dismissal at a press conference, he promised to look into the matter.82
Some time later, in an internal memorandum addressing Fitzgerald’s
possible reassignment, a White House aide remarked, “Fitzgerald is no
doubt a top-notch cost expert, but he must be given very low marks in
loyalty; and after all, loyalty is the name of the game.”83 The aide
recommended that the administration “let him bleed, for a while at least.”84
Eventually—and after a lengthy court battle that reached the U.S. Supreme
Court—Fitzgerald was, by court order, reinstated to a position in the
executive branch.85
The Nixon Administration was later implicated in the Watergate
scandal—another high-profile case involving a whistleblower—which
eventually led to President Nixon’s resignation.86 Mark Felt, infamously
known as “Deep Throat,” leaked the story that President Nixon’s reelection
campaign had broken into the Democratic National Committee
Headquarters using illegally acquired corporate funds.87 Subsequent
investigations revealed that corrupt foreign payments—in the amounts of
hundreds of millions of dollars—were made by publicly traded U.S.
companies.88 Congress enacted the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of
197789 (FCPA) in response to these revelations.90 Among other things, the
FCPA introduced requirements for companies registered with the SEC to
have internal controls, including internal whistleblower procedures.91
78. Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 733 (1982).
79. Bond, supra note 77, at 107. Some of Fitzgerald’s more famous disclosures
included those related to the Pentagon’s expenditures on $7,622 coffee pots, $670 passengerseat arm rests, and $200 hammers. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. at 735.
83. Id. at 735–36 (internal quotation marks omitted).
84. Id. at 736 (internal quotation marks omitted).
85. Bond, supra note 77, at 107.
86. Vega, supra note 73, at 493.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (codified as amended in 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to -3
(2012)).
90. Vega, supra note 73, at 494.
91. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(B).
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Therefore, whistleblower Mark Felt’s actions led to the “first transformative
moment for whistleblowers in corporate governance.”92
The next transformative moment took place after Sherron Watkins and
Cynthia Cooper uncovered major financial scandals: the Enron and
WorldCom scandals.93 In response, Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 200294 (SOX).95 Among other things, SOX included the “first set of
comprehensive federal whistleblower provisions protecting employees who
raise concerns about a violation of any federal criminal statute.”96
In 2001, Watkins submitted an anonymous internal memorandum to
Enron Chairman Ken Lay that began with the sentence “I am incredibly
nervous that we will implode in a wave of accounting scandals.”97 Watkins
knew that the company’s assets were artificially inflated via an elaborate
accounting hoax.98 Shortly after sending the memo, Watkins met with Lay,
provided five new memoranda detailing the issues, and encouraged him to
hire an independent law firm to conduct an investigation.99 Although
Watkins urged Lay not to hire the law firm that had helped structure some
of the questionable deals in the first place, Lay proceeded to do so.100 The
law firm conducted a limited investigation and reported that the transactions
were unproblematic.101 Enron filed for bankruptcy three months later.102
After learning of Watkins’s contact with Lay, Andrew Fastow—
Watkins’s supervisor and the company’s chief financial officer—reportedly
wanted to seize her computer and fire her.103 Watkins requested a transfer
to another department and her computer was returned to her, however her
work assignments decreased drastically.104 Moreover, it later emerged that
when Lay instructed the law firm to investigate Watkins’s concerns, he also
requested that the firm assess whether Watkins could be fired without any
legal repercussions.105 Although Watkins was named one of Time
magazine’s “Persons of the Year” in 2002, she reported that she was
ostracized at the company after her disclosures.106
92. Vega, supra note 73, at 493.
93. Id. at 494. In 2002, Watkins and Cooper were named Time magazine’s “Persons of
the Year.” Id. at 496.
94. Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 15 and 18 U.S.C.).
95. Vega, supra note 73, at 495.
96. Id.
97. Kathleen F. Brickey, From Enron to WorldCom and Beyond: Life and Crime After
Sarbanes-Oxley, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 357, 360 (2003).
98. Id. at 360–61.
99. Id. at 361.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 362.
103. Dan Ackman, Sherron Watkins Had Whistle, But Blew It, FORBES (Feb. 14, 2002,
3:50 PM), http://www.forbes.com/2002/02/14/0214watkins.html.
104. Brickey, supra note 97, at 362–64 & nn.28–30.
105. Id. at 362–63.
106. Tippett, supra note 52, at 17. Cynthia Cooper, who was named one of Time
magazine’s “Persons of the Year” along with Watkins, similarly discovered massive fraud
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As discussed in the Introduction to this Note, the most recent major
development with respect to whistleblowers and corporate governance, the
Dodd-Frank Act, was passed in response to the massive fraud perpetrated
by Bernie Madoff.107 Whistleblower Harry Markopolos, who worked at a
rival firm, researched Madoff’s supposed trading strategy and “became
convinced that [his] returns were not real.”108 Although Markopolos tried
to alert the SEC at least five times,109 he was ignored for years.110 During
this time, and until Madoff was finally in federal custody, Markopolos said
he feared for his life, particularly because he believed that some of the
billions of dollars at stake belonged to the Russian mafia and drug cartels
and that these groups would “kill to protect their investments.”111 In his
book, Markopolos revealed that he checked under the chassis and wheel
wells before starting his car, walked away from shadows at night, and slept
with a loaded gun nearby.112 In February 2009, Markopolos testified before
Congress’s Financial Services Committee and exposed the SEC’s failure to
detect Madoff’s fraud.113 In July 2010, President Barack Obama signed the
Dodd-Frank Act into law.114
These examples of whistleblowers’ attempts to uncover corruption show
that they often face severe professional and personal repercussions and are
regularly retaliated against or ignored, even when the underlying fraud is
potentially devastating. As discussed above, the various laws that were
enacted in response to these whistleblowers’ experiences and attempts to
reveal fraud all increased whistleblower protection in some way. The next
section explores some of the different reasons for providing this protection.
c. Why Should We Protect Whistleblowers?
The experiences of the high-profile whistleblowers discussed in the
section above show that a whistleblower’s attempts to reveal wrongdoing
are not always received positively. Part I.B and Part I.C below discuss the
various statutory and common law whistleblower protections that aim to
counterbalance this effect. Before discussing these protections, this section
explores the reasons for them: why should society protect or even
encourage actions by whistleblowers? Numerous policy reasons have been

orchestrated by WorldCom’s chief financial officer and reported it to the board of directors.
Vega, supra note 73, at 494–95.
107. See supra notes 11–19 and accompanying text.
108. Vanessa Castellina, The New Financial Incentives and Expanded Anti-retaliation
Protections for Whistleblowers Created by Section 922 of the Dodd-Frank Act: Actual
Progress or Just Politics?, 6 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 187, 187 (2011).
109. Id.
110. Id. at 188; see also supra notes 14–17 and accompanying text.
111. Harry Markopolos, Excerpt: ‘No One Would Listen,’ NPR (Mar. 2, 2010, 12:00
AM), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=124208012.
112. Id.
113. Castellina, supra note 108, at 188.
114. Id.
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put forward to answer this question.115 These justifications can be
organized into three broad categories, discussed below.116
First, protecting whistleblowers encourages legal compliance by their
employers, which in turn benefits public welfare.117 By playing a
prominent role in discovering and exposing misconduct, whistleblowers
incentivize organizations to prevent or stop illegal activity, which is “a
valuable service to both their employers and the public at large.”118
Moreover, if organizations account for the possibility of employees
becoming whistleblowers, this can deter misconduct in the first instance.119
According to this justification, because whistleblowers face inherent risks
for their actions, they should be incentivized to “break the code of silence in
corrupt organizations.”120
The second popular justification for protection is related to efficiency:
whistleblowers partially lighten the burden on government regulators.121
Without whistleblowers, government regulators would need to dedicate
more resources to detecting and investigating illegal activity.122 In other
words, whistleblowers can play a helpful law enforcement role in revealing
wrongdoing.123 Some have gone so far as to say that “[t]he primary goal of
many federal statutes, therefore, is not protection of the whistleblower.
Rather, provisions protective of whistleblowers were included primarily as
tools by which to advance the objectives of the legislation.”124 According
to this theory, as regulatory agents’ budgets shrink, whistleblowers play an
increasingly important law enforcement role.125
Finally, the third broad category of justifying protection for
whistleblowers is related to fairness and justice.126 Justifications in this
category argue that because whistleblowers are “trying to do the right
thing,”127 society should not punish them, and in fact, should try to protect
them.128
Having discussed who whistleblowers are and the different justifications
for protecting them, the next section discusses the main mechanisms for
doing so.

115. Banick, supra note 28, at 1874.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Gerard Sinzdak, An Analysis of Current Whistleblower Laws: Defending a More
Flexible Approach to Reporting Requirements, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 1633, 1635 (2008).
119. Id. at 1636.
120. Feldman & Lobel, supra note 35, at 1159.
121. Banick, supra note 28, at 1875–76.
122. Id.
123. Tippett, supra note 52, at 21–22.
124. Id. at 22 (alteration in original) (quoting Trystan Phifer O’Leary, Silencing the
Whistleblower: The Gap Between Federal and State Retaliatory Discharge, 85 IOWA L.
REV. 663, 663 (2000)).
125. Id.
126. Banick, supra note 28, at 1876.
127. Id.
128. Id.
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3. How Can We Protect Whistleblowers?
In order to examine existing whistleblower protection regimes (and their
gaps) it is useful to first discuss the different available mechanisms for
protection. Providing whistleblowers with incentives, protection, or both—
the ultimate goals—can be approached in different ways. There are four
different ways that whistleblower protection laws generally work:
(1) remedies focused on retaliation against whistleblowers, (2) remedies
that reward whistleblowers, (3) remedies that reward employers for
investigating wrongdoing and protecting whistleblowers, and (4) remedies
that punish inaction by would-be whistleblowers.129
a. Remedies Focused on Retaliation
Antiretaliation protection—and its application to in-house attorney
whistleblowers—is a central issue in this Note. Retaliation-based remedies
are the primary way by which state and federal laws have sought to protect
whistleblowers.130 Many antiretaliation protections were developed in
response to scandals such as Enron and WorldCom, where many employees
stayed silent due to fear of retribution.131 These remedies afford
whistleblowers a cause of action in the event that their employer retaliates
against them for blowing the whistle.132 Although state and federal
whistleblower protection statutes vary considerably, almost all of them
include an antiretaliation element.133 Typically, state and federal statutes
bar employers from either discharging or otherwise discriminating against a
whistleblower for their disclosure.134 Retaliation that “might dissuade a
reasonable employee from blowing the whistle” is generally prohibited.135
Remedies focused on retaliation also exist in common law.136
Employees who bring tort claims for wrongful discharge in violation of
public policy must show that their employer retaliated against or terminated
them because of their disclosure.137 Thus, even in areas where no statute
provides antiretaliation protection, courts have devised a tort-based cause of
action by holding that employees cannot be terminated for reporting legal
129. Tippett, supra note 52, at 4–15.
130. Id. at 4. “The first, and historically primary, approach has been based on
‘retaliation-based remedies.’” Banick, supra note 28, at 1879.
131. Feldman & Lobel, supra note 35, at 1161. Even celebrated Enron whistleblower,
Sherron Watkins, waited until after chief executive officer Jeffrey Skilling resigned before
she approached Chairman Ken Lay. Watkins feared she would be fired; in fact, the company
treasurer, Jeff McMahon, was transferred after complaining to Skilling about the “veil of
secrecy” surrounding the company’s accounting. Michael Duffy, By the Sign of the Crooked
E, TIME (Jan. 19, 2002), http://content.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,195268,
00.html.
132. Tippett, supra note 52, at 4.
133. Id. at 6.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 7.
137. Id.
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violations.138 However, courts vary in the extent to which they extend
antiretaliation protections to “different channels of reporting, different types
of reported misconducts, and different categories of workers.”139
b. Remedies That Reward Whistleblowers
Another type of remedy incentivizes employees to report misconduct by
providing financial rewards for certain disclosures.140 This reward-based
type of remedy is available under both federal and state statutes.141 The
Dodd-Frank Act, discussed further in Part II.B.3, is one example of this
type of remedy.142
Reward-based incentives are not as prevalent as antiretaliation protection
and are both controversial and understudied.143 Scholars have noted the
success of reward-based remedies in recovering government funds and
rewarding whistleblowers.144 On the other hand, critics of reward-based
whistleblower remedies point out that they can be unsavory to the public,
lead to a backlash against whistleblowers, and motivate frivolous claims.145
With respect to attorneys in particular, it may be undesirable for them to be
rewarded for reporting misconduct, since this could potentially incentivize
them to violate professional and ethical rules such as attorney-client
confidentiality.146
c. Remedies That Reward Employers
A third method to protect whistleblowers and promote their actions is to
provide their employers with incentives to support them. 147 This remedy
emerged in reaction to both the “federal corporate sentencing guidelines,
which provide for reduced penalties for organizations that attempt to detect
and address wrongdoing,”148 and the Supreme Court ruling in Faragher v.

138. Feldman & Lobel, supra note 35, at 1162.
139. Id. at 1163. For a discussion of wrongful discharge claims, see infra Part II.C.2.
140. Tippett, supra note 52, at 8–9.
141. Id. at 9.
142. See infra Part II.B.3.
143. Feldman & Lobel, supra note 35, at 1168.
144. See, e.g., Elletta Sangrey Callahan & Terry Morehead Dworkin, The State of State
Whistleblower Protection, 38 AM. BUS. L.J. 99, 101 (2000); James Fisher et al., Privatizing
Regulation: Whistleblowing and Bounty Hunting in the Financial Services Industries, 19
DICK. J. INT’L L. 117, 138 n.55 (2000); see also Tippett, supra note 52, at 9.
145. Tippett, supra note 52, at 10. Even a small monetary reward can cause a negative
reaction toward the whistleblower. See supra notes 67–70 and accompanying text.
146. Banick, supra note 28, at 1879–80. This Note focuses on the antiretaliation
protections afforded to attorney whistleblowers. Whether or not attorneys should be able to
take advantage of whistleblower rewards is beyond the scope of this Note. For a discussion
of this topic, see Joan C. Rogers, Ethics Rules Stop Most Corporate Lawyers from Seeking
Federal Whistle-Blower Bounty, 29 Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 677 (Oct. 23,
2013).
147. Tippett, supra note 52, at 10.
148. Id.
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City of Boca Raton,149 which “provides employers with an affirmative
defense in harassment cases where the employer takes reasonable measures
to prevent and address harassment.”150 Under the corporate sentencing
guidelines, employers may be able to take advantage of reduced liability if
they are able to demonstrate that they had procedures to protect
whistleblowers.151 Meanwhile, the “Faragher defense”152 is becoming
more popular in situations involving whistleblowers.153
Generally, there are arguments supporting a shift from an emphasis on
external to internal whistleblower reporting.154 The goal of this shift is to
incentivize the organization to stop misconduct earlier and perhaps
completely, rather than focusing on punishing organizations that fail to stop
misconduct.155 Shifting the primary focus away from the need to punish
organizations saves government funds.156 Proponents of this type of
remedy argue that by incentivizing employers to improve internal reporting
structures, disclosure is more likely to be made internally, which results in
less harm to both the whistleblower and the employer.157 Internal reporting
can also be considered to be more ethical than external reporting.158
On the other hand, opponents argue that incentivizing employers to
improve internal reporting mechanisms will cause employers to invest less
in remedying the underlying wrongdoing.159 Additionally, courts may not
have the appropriate expertise to evaluate internal reporting and compliance
structures,160 which can make this remedy difficult to enforce or encourage.
The different arguments for and against both internal and external reporting
are discussed further in Part II.A.
d. Remedies That Compel Whistleblowing
The legislation that followed the early twenty-first century financial
scandals included a range of affirmative duties.161 Affirmative duties—
which, in effect, require mandatory whistleblowing—are usually limited to
senior corporate officers and members of select professions, such as

149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

524 U.S. 775 (1998).
Id. at 807–08; see also Tippett, supra note 52, at 10.
Tippett, supra note 52, at 10–11.
Id. at 11.
Id.
Terry Morehead Dworkin, Whistleblowing, MNCs, and Peace, 35 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 457, 463 (2002).
155. Tippett, supra note 52, at 11.
156. Dworkin, supra note 154, at 463; see also supra notes 121–25 and accompanying
text.
157. Tippett, supra note 52, at 11.
158. Dworkin, supra note 154, at 463.
159. Tippett, supra note 52, at 11.
160. Id.
161. Feldman & Lobel, supra note 35, at 1164 (“For example, the affirmative reporting
duties imposed under SOX extend to both attorneys and executives of public companies
subject to SEC proceedings or investigations.”).
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attorneys.162 Usually, these duties are limited to situations where either the
victim of potential misconduct is especially vulnerable or where the
resulting harm will be widespread.163
Many affirmative duties impose civil and criminal liabilities in the event
of a failure to report.164 In their most extreme form of criticism, these
forms of mandatory whistleblowing or punitive whistleblowing remedies
have been seen “as an affront to civil liberties and have been compared to
Nazi Germany, Stalinist Russia, and McCarthyism.”165 However, some
statutes still do mandate whistleblowing in limited situations.166 For
example, New Jersey and Florida rules require lawyers to disclose a client’s
intent to commit a future crime.167
A leading example of a punitive approach to whistleblowing, and one
that is prominently featured in this Note, is SOX, discussed further in Part
II.B.2. Although some parts of SOX still require corporate actors to report
misconduct in specific situations,168 the SEC initially intended the Act to
have more stringent mandatory whistleblowing requirements.169
Originally, the SEC proposed regulations that mandated attorneys to
withdraw representation from public companies that failed to respond
adequately to corporate fraud allegations and to alert the SEC of their
withdrawal.170 This “noisy withdrawal” requirement was vehemently
opposed and was eventually dropped from the final regulation.171
While SOX does not require corporate actors to directly report violations
to government regulators, it does require them to make internal disclosures
or investigations in certain situations.172 However, the positive reporting
obligations in SOX are limited to the most senior ranks of the corporation,
thereby narrowing the affirmative duty to report to those that are able to
prevent violations early on.173 Since SOX does not reward disclosure but
does punish inaction,174 it is an example of a punitive approach to
promoting whistleblowing.
162. Id. at 1163.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Tippett, supra note 52, at 12.
166. Id.
167. Id.; see also FLA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4-1.6(b)(1) (“A lawyer shall reveal
such information to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary: . . . to prevent a
client from committing a crime . . . . ”); N.J. CT. R. 1.6(b) (“A lawyer shall reveal such
information to the proper authorities, as soon as, and to the extent the lawyer reasonably
believes necessary, to prevent the client or another person . . . from committing a criminal,
illegal or fraudulent act that the lawyer reasonably believes is likely to result in death or
substantial bodily harm or substantial injury to the financial interest or property of
another . . . .”).
168. Tippett, supra note 52, at 13.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 14.
173. Feldman & Lobel, supra note 35, at 1164.
174. Tippett, supra note 52, at 13–14.
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Having discussed who whistleblowers are, why they should be protected,
and the different mechanisms for protecting them, the next two sections of
this Note explore some existing whistleblower protection regimes that are
relevant to federal securities violations.
B. The Federal Securities Laws Protecting Whistleblowers
Part I.B gives an overview of the main protections afforded to
whistleblowers at a federal level, particularly with respect to whistleblowers
who report federal securities law violations.
1. General Federal Whistleblower Protections
Laws protecting federal employees who become whistleblowers have
existed for more than three decades.175 The Whistleblower Protection Act
of 1989176 (WPA) forbids federal government employers from retaliating
against employees for whistleblowing177 and is currently the primary
federal statute that encourages and protects whistleblowers who are federal
employees.178 However, the WPA does not protect employees of private
organizations.179 Therefore, employees of private organizations may have
to look to other federal statutes, or remedies under state law, for
whistleblower protection.180 However, many whistleblower protection
provisions are included as “one mechanism within greater enforcement
schemes” in various federal statutes.181 These statutes can be limited in
scope in that they protect disclosures within specific industries.182
In contrast to the WPA, which protects only federal employees,
whistleblower protections under the False Claims Act183 (FCA) cover
disclosures that reveal attempts to defraud the federal government.184
Although the FCA covers a wide range of activities relating to the federal
government,185 and is one of the most well-known statutes offering
whistleblower awards, it is aimed at recovering government funds.186 Since
the FCA only provides whistleblower protection for those who make
175. Robert J. McCarthy, Blowing in the Wind: Answers for Federal Whistleblowers, 3
WM. & MARY POL’Y REV. 184, 185 (2012) (“Whistleblower protection laws have been on the
books for over thirty years, encouraging United States Government employees to report
fraud, waste, and abuse, while promising to protect them from retaliation.”).
176. Pub. L. No. 101-12, 103 Stat. 16 (codified in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.).
177. Banick, supra note 28, at 1876–77.
178. McCarthy, supra note 175, at 186.
179. Banick, supra note 28, at 1877.
180. Id. at 1877–78.
181. Id. at 1877 n.42.
182. Id. For example, the Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2622(a) (2012),
protects employees who commence, testify in, assist, or participate in actions related to the
reporting and testing of chemical substances. Id.
183. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–3733.
184. See generally Douglas K. Rosenblum & John A. Schwab, FCA 101:
A Practitioner’s Guide to the False Claims Act, 26 CRIM. JUST. 26 (2011).
185. Id. at 27.
186. Tippett, supra note 52, at 9.
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disclosures about fraud against the federal government,187 whistleblowers
who make disclosures about fraud against private parties will have to look
elsewhere for protection.
In the realm of federal securities law, whistleblowers who are private
employees, or who make disclosures about private organizations, may find
protection under SOX or the Dodd-Frank Act. These are discussed in turn
below.
2. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act
As mentioned in Part I.A.3, SOX was signed into law predominantly in
response to large-scale corporate scandals such as Enron and WorldCom.188
The legislation, which at least in the past has been called “the gold
standard” of whistleblower protection,189 aimed to boost confidence in
financial markets by regulating financial market reporting and improving
protection for whistleblowers that report suspected wrongdoing.190
By enacting SOX, Congress introduced federal whistleblower protection
to corporate America.191 Public companies are prohibited from demoting,
suspending, threatening, harassing, or discriminating against employees
who engage in protected activities.192 Under SOX, employees can disclose
information relating to what they reasonably believe is a violation of federal
securities law.193 Thus, while some whistleblower protection provisions
require a violation to have actually occurred for a whistleblower to be
protected, under SOX an employee only needs to reasonably believe that it
did.194 Finally, whistleblowers are generally protected if they disclose
information either internally, to a supervisor or to someone who has
authority to investigate misconduct, or externally, to federal regulatory or
law enforcement agencies or a member of Congress.195
The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) enforces
SOX’s whistleblower antiretaliation provisions by conducting an
187. Id.
188. Chinyere Ajanwachuku, An In-House Counsel’s Decision To Whistleblow, 25 GEO.
J. LEGAL ETHICS 379, 381 (2012); Castellina, supra note 108, at 189; Sarah L. Reid & Serena
B. David, The Evolution of the SEC Whistleblower: From Sarbanes-Oxley to Dodd-Frank,
129 BANKING L.J. 907, 908 (2012); Kevin Rubinstein, Internal Whistleblowing and
Sarbanes-Oxley Section 806: Balancing the Interests of Employee and Employer, 52 N.Y.L.
SCH. L. REV. 637, 638 (2008).
189. Feldman & Lobel, supra note 35, at 1161 (citing Cynthia Eastland, Rebuilding the
Law of the Workplace in an Era of Self-Regulation, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 319, 376 (2005)).
190. Castellina, supra note 108, at 195.
191. Rubinstein, supra note 188, at 646 (“The anti-retaliation provision applies to
companies whose securities are registered under Section 12 of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 . . . or companies that are required to file reports under Section 15(d) of the . . .
Exchange Act.”).
192. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (2012). In November 2013, the U.S. Supreme Court extended
this protection to employees of private contractors and subcontractors that serve public
companies. Lawson v. FMR LLC, 134 S. Ct. 1158 (2013).
193. Rubinstein, supra note 188, at 647.
194. Id.
195. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a)(1)(A)–(C).
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administrative proceeding after a whistleblower files a complaint.196 An
employee who has faced adverse treatment from an employer for reporting
misconduct has ninety days from the date of the discrimination to bring a
claim to OSHA.197 If there is no decision within 180 days, the
whistleblower can bring the claim in a federal district court for de novo
review.198 Furthermore, if OSHA does issue a final order, an aggrieved
party has the option of filing an appeal in a federal district court.199
By protecting private employees who disclose potential federal securities
violations, the passage of SOX increased awareness of the need for
corporate governance structures.200 The passage of the Dodd-Frank Act
was “a step farther on that continuum,” both by providing financial
incentives for whistleblowers to come forward and by providing enhanced
whistleblower protections.201
3. The Dodd-Frank Act
As discussed in the Introduction to this Note, in July 2010, in response to
the 2008 financial crisis, Congress enacted the Dodd-Frank Act to bolster
accountability and transparency within the U.S. financial system. 202 One of
the ways in which Congress intended to achieve this goal was to incentivize
whistleblowers to share their information with the government.203 Partly
prompted by the Madoff scandal,204 the Dodd-Frank Act amended the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 by protecting and rewarding those who
help the SEC enforce securities law.205 In addition to providing financial
incentives for whistleblowers, the Dodd-Frank Act “strengthens the antiretaliation provisions of SOX.”206

196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.

Rubinstein, supra note 188, at 648.
18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(2)(D).
Id. § 1514A(b)(1)(B).
29 C.F.R. § 1980.112(a) (2013).
Ashcroft et al., supra note 56, at 373.
Mark J. Oberti, New Wave of Employment Retaliation and Whistleblowing, 38 T.
MARSHALL L. REV. 43, 86–87 (2012) (quoting JOHN S. ADLER ET AL., THE LITTLER REPORT,
DODD-FRANK AND THE SEC FINAL RULE: FROM PROTECTED EMPLOYEE TO BOUNTY HUNTER
1 (2011), available at http://www.littler.com/files/press/pdf/LittlerReportDoddFrankAndThe
SECFinalRule.pdf).
202. Dodd-Frank Wall Street and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124
Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered titles of the 7, 12, 15, 18, 22, 31, and 42
U.S.C.); Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA), L.L.C., 720 F.3d 620, 622–23 (5th Cir. 2013).
203. Recent Legislation, Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 922, 134 Stat. 1376,
1841–49 (2010) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6), 124 HARV. L. REV. 1829, 1829–30
(2011).
204. See supra notes 107–14 and accompanying text.
205. Potential Circuit Split Creates an Uncertain Future for Whistleblower Protection of
Internal Reporting, CLIENT ALERT (White & Case LLP, New York, N.Y.), July 2013, at 1,
available at http://www.whitecase.com/files/Publication/3751dc20-7b59-4509-a63a-44b100
80182d/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/1c96e6b5-0741-4ddb-85b2-4bebfa027176/alertwhistleblower-protection-internal-reporting.pdf.
206. Castellina, supra note 108, at 199.
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The securities whistleblower incentives and protections provisions of the
Dodd-Frank Act encourage whistleblowers to report possible violations by
requiring the SEC to pay monetary awards to those who provide
information that leads to a successful enforcement action related to a federal
securities violation.207 Whistleblowers who provide the SEC with original
information that leads to a successful enforcement are awarded between 10
to 30 percent of the recovered funds.208
The Dodd-Frank Act also provides a private cause of action for
whistleblowers who allege that an employer has retaliated against them for
making a protected disclosure.209 Therefore, in contrast to whistleblowers
who must file antiretaliation claims with OSHA for protection under
SOX,210 under the Dodd-Frank Act, they can file actions directly in federal
courts.211 Additionally, the Dodd-Frank Act increases the statute of
limitations to either “six years from the date of the violation, or three years
after the employee knew or should have known the material facts relating to
the violation.”212 This provides an extended time period for whistleblowers
and their ability to bring retaliation claims, compared to the ninety-day
window provided under SOX.213
The securities whistleblower incentives and protections section of the
Dodd-Frank Act initially defines the term “whistleblower” as “any
individual who provides, or 2 or more individuals acting jointly who
provide, information relating to a violation of the securities laws to the
Commission, in a manner established, by rule or regulation, by the
Commission.”214 This definition “expressly and unambiguously requires
that an individual provide information to the SEC to qualify as a
‘whistleblower’” under the Dodd-Frank Act.215 Therefore, those who
report violations internally generally do not qualify as whistleblowers under
this definition.
However, the antiretaliation section of the Dodd-Frank Act separately
outlines protections for whistleblowers who make “disclosures that are
required or protected under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 . . . section
1513(e) of Title 18, and any other law, rule, or regulation subject to the
jurisdiction of the Commission.”216
One interpretation of this provision is that it “establishes a narrow
exception to . . . [the] definition of ‘whistleblower,’ and protects an

207. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6 (2012).
208. Id. § 78u-6(b)(1). Therefore, the Dodd-Frank Act includes a reward-based remedy
to incentivize whistleblowers to come forward with information.
209. Id. § 78u-6(h)(1)(B)(i).
210. See supra notes 196–99 and accompanying text.
211. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(B)(i).
212. Id.
213. See supra note 197 and accompanying text.
214. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(6).
215. Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA), L.L.C., 720 F.3d 620, 623 (5th Cir. 2013).
216. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A)(iii).
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employee who makes any of that provision’s enumerated disclosures.”217
Under this reading of the provision, those who disclose violations within
these exceptions can still be afforded antiretaliation protection, even if they
do not report directly to the SEC.218 As a result of this ambiguity, courts in
the Second, Fifth, Sixth, and Tenth Circuits have disagreed on how to
reconcile the whistleblower definition and antiretaliation provisions of the
Dodd-Frank Act.219 This has resulted in an extra layer of ambiguity
regarding how in-house attorney whistleblowers are expected to respond to
potential federal securities violations.220
Under the authority delegated to it by Congress, the SEC promulgated a
final rule in August 2011 to implement the Dodd-Frank Act.221 The
regulations clarify the relationship between the provisions of the DoddFrank Act that define the term “whistleblower” and those that provide
antiretaliation protections.222 In its comments to the rule, the SEC
explained that the antiretaliation protections apply to “individuals who
report to persons or governmental authorities other than the
Commission.”223 Moreover, the rule went a step further by providing
additional incentives for whistleblowers to make internal disclosures.224 By
voluntarily using the organization’s internal reporting structure,
whistleblowers may be eligible for a higher reward, should a successful
enforcement action ever take place.225 Additionally, if a whistleblower
internally reports misconduct that is later shared with the SEC by another
party, such as the organization, the information will still be attributed to the
whistleblower and he or she will still be eligible for an award.226 Finally,
217. Murray v. UBS Sec., LLC, No. 12 Civ. 5914(JMF), 2013 WL 2190084, at *3
(S.D.N.Y. May 21, 2013).
218. Id.
219. Compare Asadi, 720 F.3d at 623 (denying antiretaliation protection to
whistleblowers who do not report directly to the SEC), with Rosenblum v. Thomson Reuters
(Markets) LLC, No. 13 Civ. 2219(SAS), 2013 WL 5780775 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 25, 2013)
(allowing antiretaliation protection for whistleblowers who do not report directly to the
SEC), Ellington v. Giacoumakis, No. 13–11791–RGS, 2013 WL 5631046 (D. Mass. Oct. 16,
2013) (same), Murray, 2013 WL 2190084 (same), Genberg v. Porter, No. 11-cv-02434WYD-MEH, 2013 WL 1222056 (D. Colo. Mar. 25, 2013) (same), Kramer v. Trans-Lux
Corp., No. 3:11cv1424 (SRU), 2012 WL 4444820 (D. Conn. Sept. 25, 2012) (same), Nollner
v. S. Baptist Convention, Inc., 852 F. Supp. 2d 986 (M.D. Tenn. 2012) (same), and Egan v.
TradingScreen, Inc., No. 10 Civ. 8202(LBS), 2011 WL 1672066, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. May 4,
2011) (same).
220. The different steps that in-house counsel must take under different regimes are
outlined in Part I.D and the resulting conflict is discussed in Part II.
221. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-2 (2014).
222. Id.
223. Id.; Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections, 76 Fed. Reg. 34,300,
34,301 (June 13, 2011) (emphasis added). As recently as October 2013, former SEC
officials have noted that “Dodd-Frank and its implementing rules permit whistleblowers to
report violations internally before or simultaneous with any reporting to the SEC.” Brief of
Former SEC Officials As Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 13, Lawson v. FMR
LLC, 133 S. Ct. 2387 (2013) (No. 12-3), 2013 WL 5553459.
224. Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections, 76 Fed. Reg. at 34,300–01.
225. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-6(a)(2).
226. Id. § 240.21F-4(b)(5).
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should the whistleblower report information internally on a certain date, it
can be treated as if he or she had reported the information to the SEC on
that date.227
In Murray v. UBS Securities, LLC,228 the Southern District of New York
followed the SEC’s interpretation described above.
The plaintiff
whistleblower sued his former employer under the Dodd-Frank Act for
allegedly firing him in retaliation for his internal disclosures.229 Murray
was dismissed after he complained to his supervisors that he was, in
violation of federal securities laws, being forced to produce misleading
reports.230 His former employer argued that whistleblowers who report
information internally are not protected under the Dodd-Frank Act’s
antiretaliation provisions.231
The court applied the two-step analysis from Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.232 to decide whether the SEC’s
interpretation of the Dodd-Frank Act warranted deference.233 Noting that
the tension between the definition and antiretaliation provisions of the
Dodd-Frank Act results in an ambiguity,234 the court moved to the second
step of the Chevron analysis. At the second step, the court argued that the
SEC’s interpretation is reasonable, and that it therefore warrants
deference.235 The court also noted that the SEC’s interpretation is
consistent with the interpretations of four other district courts from the
Second, Sixth, and Tenth Circuits.236
In October 2013, the Southern District of New York repeated this
reasoning in Rosenblum v. Thomson Reuters (Markets) LLC.237 Mark
227. Id. § 240.21F-4(b)(7).
This can help cover whistleblowers who may otherwise fall outside the statute of limitations
under the Dodd-Frank Act.
228. No. 12 Civ. 5914(JMF), 2013 WL 2190084 (S.D.N.Y. May 21, 2013).
229. Id. at *1–2.
230. Id.
231. Id. at *1.
232. Id. at *4. This analysis is used to determine whether or not a court must defer to an
agency’s interpretation of a statute—in this case, the SEC’s interpretation of the Dodd-Frank
Act. According to the Supreme Court,
When a court reviews an agency’s construction of the statute which it administers,
it is confronted with two questions. First, always, is the question whether
Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If the intent of
Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency,
must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. If, however,
the court determines Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at
issue, the court does not simply impose its own construction on the statute, as
would be necessary in the absence of an administrative interpretation. Rather, if
the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for
the court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of
the statute.
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984).
233. Murray, 2013 WL 2190084, at *4.
234. Id.
235. Id. at *5.
236. Id.
237. No. 13 Civ. 2219(SAS), 2013 WL 5780775 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 25, 2013).
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Rosenblum suspected that his employer, Thomson Reuters, through one of
its products, was releasing financial information to certain subscribers
before others.238 He suspected that this constituted insider trading and
attempted to raise the issue with higher authorities.239 After being
discouraged more than once and being told to “stop trying to figure out
what Thomson [was] doing wrong, and close more business,” Rosenblum
disclosed his concerns to the Federal Bureau of Investigation.240 Some
weeks after the disclosure, he was fired and subsequently brought an action
against Thomson under the antiretaliation provisions of the Dodd-Frank
Act.241
The defendant argued that the court should follow the Fifth Circuit’s
ruling in Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA), L.L.C.,242 decided a few months
prior243 in order to deny the plaintiff whistleblower antiretaliation
protection under the Dodd-Frank Act.244 Again, the court found the statute
to be ambiguous and deferred to the SEC’s interpretation, which it found
reasonable.245 The defendant’s motion to dismiss (on this and other
grounds) was denied,246 and the plaintiff was allowed to proceed with his
claim even though he did not report the violation in question directly to the
SEC.247
Some months prior to Rosenblum, in July 2013, the Fifth Circuit ruled
differently and dismissed an antiretaliation claim where the violation was
reported internally, finding that the employee was not protected under the
Dodd-Frank Act because he did not report the violation directly to the
SEC.248 In Asadi, Khaled Asadi brought suit against his former employer,
G.E. Energy, claiming that he was dismissed after internally reporting to his
supervisors that the company was violating the FCPA.249
The court addressed the opposing case law and the SEC regulation and
determined that the “perceived conflict” between the definition and
antiretaliation provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act “rests on a misreading of
the operative provisions.”250 According to the court, the antiretaliation
provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act “represent the protected activity in a
whistleblower-protection claim. They do not, however, define which
individuals qualify as whistleblowers.”251 Under this interpretation, the
antiretaliation provisions protect whistleblowers from retaliation against
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.

Id. at *1.
Id. at *1–2.
Id. at *2 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at *1–2.
720 F.3d 620 (5th Cir. 2013).
See infra notes 248–53 and accompanying text.
Rosenblum, 2013 WL 5780775, at *4.
Id. at *5.
Id. at *6.
Id. at *3.
Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA), L.L.C., 720 F.3d 620 (5th Cir. 2013).
Id. at 621.
Id. at 624–25.
Id. at 625.
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any subsequent action or disclosure “that follows on the heels of the
information initially provided to the SEC.”252 Thus, a whistleblower would
be protected under Dodd-Frank against retaliation for disclosures under
SOX, even if they were made internally, only after an initial disclosure to
the SEC.253
The court in Asadi concluded that the SEC’s regulation interpreted the
term “whistleblower” too broadly and created an exception that conflicted
with Congress’s intent as demonstrated by the plain language of the DoddFrank Act.254 This Fifth Circuit decision, along with the related uncertainty
over the extent to which whistleblowers in general and attorneys in
particular are protected under the Dodd-Frank Act, is discussed further in
Part I.D.6.
Before exploring the ways in which different federal whistleblower
protections apply to attorneys, the next section will discuss the different
state laws that protect whistleblowers and why these can still be relevant to
those who report federal securities violations.
C. The State Laws Protecting Whistleblowers
Although this Note addresses the conflicts experienced by in-house
attorney whistleblowers who report federal securities violations, state laws
can still be relevant. Even if a whistleblower is retaliated against for
reporting a federal securities violation, he or she may still be able to pursue
antiretaliation protection under a state whistleblower statute.255 Moreover,
if the retaliation is in the form of dismissal, the whistleblower may have a
tort-based wrongful discharge cause of action under common law.256 The
sections below explain these two remedies.
1. State Whistleblower Statutes
All states now have whistleblower statutes,257 and they all include some
form of antiretaliation protection.258
However, the protection of
whistleblowers under state law still varies widely, both in the extent of
protection provided under the statutes and in the judicial interpretations of
the statutes.259 For example, most states protect public employee
whistleblowers, while a minority protects private employees as well.260
Some state statutes limit protection depending on the type of violation that
the whistleblower aimed to expose; for example, New York only protects
whistleblowers who reveal violations that pose a “substantial and specific
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.

Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A)(ii) (2012)).
Id.
Id. at 629–30.
See infra Part I.C.1.
See infra Part I.C.2.
Sinzdak, supra note 118, at 1641.
Rubinstein, supra note 188, at 643.
Id.
Id.
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danger to public health or safety.”261 New Hampshire, on the other hand,
extends protection to whistleblowers who, with reasonable belief, report a
potential violation of any state law.262 Overall, the major areas of
distinction among state whistleblower protections include:
which
employees are protected, who the whistleblower should report to in order to
be protected, what type of activity the whistleblower reports, whether or not
the underlying violation must be actual or can be suspected, and what kind
of remedies are available.263
The biggest division among states is to whom a whistleblower can report
wrongdoing in order to be protected.264 Several state statutes extend
whistleblower protection only to employees who disclose misconduct
externally to government bodies.265 A few states require employees to first
report suspected wrongdoing internally, to their employers, in order to
benefit from whistleblower protection.266 A handful of states are more
flexible, allowing whistleblowers to make either internal or external
reports.267
Therefore, whether or not a whistleblower is protected under a state
statute may depend on what state they happen to be in. Even if a
whistleblower is not protected under a state statute, the next section
explores possible antiretaliation protections under common law.
2. Common Law Wrongful Discharge Tort Claims
Aside from statutory antiretaliation provisions, most states now recognize
a cause of action under the common law tort of wrongful discharge.268
Similar to statutory protections, state-by-state variations exist on the
elements of a wrongful discharge claim.269 Some of the differences are
similar to the differences among state whistleblower protections; for
example, there are state variations on wrongful discharge claims depending
on whether the employee reports internally or externally, or on what type of
violation the employee reports.270 Some states do not provide a remedy
under wrongful discharge if the whistleblower reports a federal law
violation and only extend this protection if it was a state law violation.271
Furthermore, in some states the state whistleblower statute has been

261. N.Y. LAB. LAW § 740(2)(a) (McKinney 2006).
262. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 275-E:2 (2007).
263. Rubinstein, supra note 188, at 643; Sinzdak, supra note 118, at 1641–42.
264. Sinzdak, supra note 118, at 1633, 1642.
265. Id.
266. Id. at 1634.
267. Id. at 1642–43.
268. Id. at 1643 (“Around forty states recognize the common law tort of wrongful
discharge in violation of public policy.”).
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. Id.
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interpreted to preempt a wrongful discharge claim for whistleblowers, while
other states have allowed both remedies to coexist.272
One example of a state court interpretation of a wrongful discharge claim
is Nordling v. Northern States Power Co., where an in-house attorney
brought a wrongful discharge tort claim against his former employer.273
Nordling had complained to his superiors about what he believed was the
unjustified surveillance of employees and the resulting invasion of the
employees’ privacy.274 In response, Nordling’s phone calls were monitored
and he was accused of spending time on personal matters during the
workday and of spending too much time outside of the office.275 He was
dismissed shortly thereafter.276
The Supreme Court of Minnesota dismissed Nordling’s claim on the
basis that the underlying misconduct for which he claimed to have been
wrongfully discharged was not illegal under either federal or state law.277
Although the surveillance “seem[ed] distasteful” and “ill-advised,” the
court reasoned, it was not illegal.278 Therefore, his dismissal for
complaining about the surveillance was not sufficient for the purposes of a
wrongful discharge tort claim.279
Although the court in Nordling analyzed the wrongful discharge claim in
terms of the legality of the violation that was reported, other courts have
applied a completely different analysis to wrongful discharge claims
brought by in-house attorney whistleblowers.280
D. Attorney Whistleblowers
Part I.D explores the special considerations of attorney whistleblowers
and how they are treated under the various applicable whistleblower
regimes. First, this Part discusses why attorneys in general, and in-house
counsel in particular, face special considerations as whistleblowers. Next, it
explores how whistleblower attorneys are expected to act under the various
regimes that apply to them in the federal securities law context.
1. Why Do Attorney Whistleblowers Matter?
By nature of their professions, attorneys are especially well placed to act
as whistleblowers.281 Within their roles and due to their expertise,
attorneys may already be responsible for leading corporate investigations
272. Id.
273. Nordling v. N. States Power Co., 478 N.W.2d 498, 500 (Minn. 1991).
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. Id. at 504.
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. See infra Part I.D.3 (discussing how state courts have treated the interplay between
whistleblower protection laws and state rules of professional conduct).
281. Tippett, supra note 52, at 37.
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into allegations of misconduct.282 Moreover, attorneys are able to analyze
“grey areas of fact and law to determine whether or not the alleged conduct
is in fact illegal and whether the evidence supports the allegations.”283 In
short, attorneys are better qualified to recognize wrongdoing, both because
of their professional responsibilities and because of their expertise.284
Furthermore, when placed in a position where they have to make the
decision of whether or not to report organizational misconduct, in-house
attorneys are in a unique position of being both a lawyer for, and an
employee of, the organization.285 The relationship between an in-house
attorney and his or her client “cannot be characterized solely as an attorneyclient relationship, but must be viewed as an employer-employee
relationship as well.”286 Unlike outside counsel, in-house attorneys cannot
make the relatively simpler decision to withdraw representation.287 Since
the corporation is the in-house attorney’s only client, withdrawal of
representation can be an inadequate solution.288 Additionally, unlike
outside counsel, in-house attorneys are increasingly occupying managerial
and supervisory roles within corporations.289 Because they increasingly
have “administrative, managerial, and compliance responsibilities that are
outside the direct scope of their legal roles,”290 in-house attorneys are even
more likely to discover information about corporate misconduct. While it
may be possible for an in-house attorney to bring the misconduct to his or
her employer’s attention and resolve it internally, it is possible that the
“employer’s vision of what is right in any given situation conflicts with the
Model Code of Professional Responsibility, the lawyer’s personal ethical
beliefs, and/or the well being of the community.”291 Whistleblower cases
involving in-house counsel must take into account the conflicting public
policies of ensuring the employer complies with the law, while protecting
the attorney-client privilege that the employer is entitled to as the client.292
Thus, in addition to ethical and legal considerations, in-house counsel must
consider the possibility of losing his or her job and livelihood.293
Having touched on some of the special conflicts faced by in-house
attorneys, the next few sections explore how they are expected to act under
282. Id. at 37–38.
283. Id. at 38.
284. Orly Lobel, Lawyering Loyalties: Speech Rights and Duties Within Twenty-FirstCentury New Governance, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 1245, 1264–65 (2009).
285. Banick, supra note 28, at 1882–83 (citing John M. Burman, Ethical Considerations
When Representing Organizations, 3 WYO. L. REV. 581, 613 (2003)).
286. Id. at 1908.
287. Id. at 1884.
288. John Jacob Kobus, Jr., Establishing Corporate Counsel’s Right To Sue for
Retaliatory Discharge, 29 VAL. U. L. REV. 1343, 1378 (1995).
289. Lobel, supra note 284, at 1262.
290. Id.
291. Nancy Kubasek et al., The Social Obligation of Corporate Counsel:
A
Communitarian Justification for Allowing In-House Counsel to Sue for Retaliatory
Discharge, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 665, 666 (1998).
292. Kobus, supra note 288, at 1364.
293. Banick, supra note 28, at 1884.
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different regimes when deciding whether or not to report potential federal
securities law violations.
2. The ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct
In 1977, the American Bar Association (ABA) began a six-year study of
the legal profession that resulted in the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct.294 The Model Rules were adopted by the ABA in 1983 and were
amended on fourteen different occasions before 2002.295 In 2003, the ABA
made amendments to Rules 1.6 and 1.13 in response to “shaken confidence
in the effectiveness of the governance and disclosure systems applicable to
public companies in the United States” in the aftermath of Enron,
WorldCom, and other similar scandals.296 While the Model Rules are not
directly enforceable through professional discipline,297 they aim to set
baseline standards of legal ethics and professional responsibility for states
to adopt through their own bar associations.
Three ABA Model Rules are particularly relevant to in-house attorney
whistleblowers: Rules 4.1, 1.13, and 1.6.
a. Truthfulness in Statements to Others: Rule 4.1
Under the first part of Rule 4.1, a lawyer should not, in the course of
representing a client, knowingly make a false statement of material fact or
law to a third party.298 The second part of the rule provides that a lawyer
should not knowingly fail to disclose a material fact that is “necessary to
avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by a client.”299
While the ABA Model Rules prohibit lawyers from assisting or
counseling clients with criminal conduct,300 Rule 4.1 sets forth a specific
application of this principle.
Generally, a lawyer may withdraw
representation to avoid assisting with criminal conduct.301 However, as
stated in the comments to Rule 4.1, “Sometimes it may be necessary for the
lawyer to give notice of the fact of withdrawal and to disaffirm an opinion,
document, affirmation or the like. . . . If the lawyer can avoid assisting a
client’s crime or fraud only by disclosing this information, then . . . the
lawyer is required to do so.”302

294. ELLEN J. BENNETT, ELIZABETH J. COHEN & MARTIN WHITTAKER, ANNOTATED MODEL
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, at vii (7th ed. 2011).
295. Id.
296. Id.
297. Barry R. Temkin & Ben Moskovits, Lawyers As Whistleblowers Under the DoddFrank Wall Street Reform Act: Ethical Conflicts Under the Rules of Professional Conduct
and SEC Rules, N.Y. ST. B. ASS’N J., July/Aug. 2012, at 10, 12.
298. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.1 (2013).
299. Id.
300. Id. R. 1.2(d).
301. Id. R. 4.1 cmt 3.
302. Id.
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To the limited extent that this rule allows lawyers to disclose
information, it is relevant to attorney whistleblowers who may wish to
avoid assisting criminal conduct. Importantly, however, Rule 4.1 permits
lawyers to disclose such information “unless the disclosure is prohibited by
Rule 1.6.”303
Therefore, Rule 4.1 is only available to attorney
whistleblowers if Rule 1.6 allows for it.304
b. Confidentiality of Information: Rule 1.6
The attorney’s duty to protect his or her client’s confidential information
is outlined in Rule 1.6,305 which has been adopted in some form by the
District of Columbia and all states except California.306 This rule generally
requires that lawyers maintain client confidentiality but permits disclosure
in six circumstances, two of which were specifically added in 2003 in
response to the Enron and WorldCom scandals.307 Prior to the addition of
these two exceptions, the ABA Model Rules prohibited disclosure of
confidential client information even when the disclosure was made in order
to prevent criminal fraud.308 Since most states at the time already allowed
disclosure under those circumstances, and in an effort to align the Model
Rules with newly enacted SEC rules, the ABA added the two additional
exceptions to the confidentiality duty.309
As a result of the amendment, in addition to preexisting exceptions,
lawyers are allowed to disclose confidential information if they believe
disclosure is reasonably necessary to prevent crime or fraud “that is
reasonably certain to result in substantial injury to the financial interests or
property of another and in furtherance of which the client has used or is
using the lawyer’s services,” or “to prevent, mitigate or rectify substantial
injury to the financial interests or property of another that is reasonably
certain to result or has resulted from the client’s commission of a crime or
fraud in furtherance of which the client has used the lawyer’s services.”310
303. Id.
304. Id.
305. Id. R. 1.6.
306. Attorneys As SEC Whistleblowers: Can an Attorney Blow the Whistle on a Client
and Get a Monetary Award? CLIENT ALERT (Latham & Watkins LLP, New York, N.Y.), May
2013, at 6, [hereinafter, Attorneys As SEC Whistleblowers], available at
http://www.lw.com/thoughtLeadership/SEC-whistleblowers.
307. Temkin & Moskovits, supra note 297, at 16; see also BENNETT, COHEN
& WHITTAKER, supra note 294, at viii.
308. See Attorneys As SEC Whistleblowers, supra note 306, at 2.
309. Id.
310. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (b)(2)–(3) (2013). The other exceptions
are:
to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm . . . to secure legal
advice about the lawyer’s compliance with these Rules . . . to establish a claim or
defense on behalf of the lawyer in a controversy between the lawyer and the client,
to establish a defense to a criminal charge or civil claim against the lawyer based
upon conduct in which the client was involved, or to respond to allegations in any
proceeding concerning the lawyer’s representation of the client . . . to comply with
other law or a court order . . . [and] to detect and resolve conflicts of interest
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However, when considering whether or not to report violations, an inhouse attorney whistleblower must also consider Rule 1.13 (and its state
rule equivalent in his or her jurisdiction).
c. Organization As Client: Rule 1.13
Generally speaking, the Model Rules allow a lawyer to withdraw from
representing a client in various situations, such as in order to avoid assisting
with “crime or fraud.”311 An in-house lawyer, however, may be subject to
special considerations that arise from being in an employer-employee
relationship with his or her client: the ABA Model Rules refer to this
situation in Rule 1.13.
Rule 1.13 provides that an in-house lawyer should report a potential legal
violation that is likely to result in substantial injury to the organization to
the highest authority in the organization, unless the lawyer reasonably
believes that it is not in the organization’s best interest to do so.312
Therefore, the ABA Model Rules require in-house lawyers to report “upthe-ladder.” As stated by the comments to Rule 1.13, “Any measures taken
should, to the extent practicable, minimize the risk of revealing information
relating to the representation to persons outside the organization.”313
The lawyer is permitted to disclose confidential information to outside
sources only if the lawyer reports the violation to the higher authority who
refuses to act or delays action, and the lawyer believes that the violation is
reasonably certain to result in substantial injury to the organization.314
Although in this situation the lawyer may disclose information regardless of
whether or not Rule 1.6 permits it, disclosure is limited to situations in
which “the lawyer reasonably believes [it is] necessary to prevent
substantial injury to the organization.”315 Moreover, this part of the rule is
merely permissive—it allows lawyers to choose to disclose information
externally, but does not require them to do so.
Rule 1.13 also provides that lawyers who believe they have been
discharged because of the actions described above, or who withdraw under
these circumstances, should take steps as reasonably necessary to ensure
that “the organization’s highest authority is informed of the [lawyer’s]
discharge or withdrawal.”316 This provision does not mention, however, an
external remedy if the organization retaliates against the lawyer.317

arising from the lawyer’s change of employment or from changes in the
composition or ownership of a firm, but only if the revealed information would not
compromise the attorney-client privilege or otherwise prejudice the client.
Id.
311.
312.
313.
314.
315.
316.
317.

Id. R. 1.16 (b)(3).
Id. R. 1.13.
Id. R. 1.13 cmt. 4.
Id. R. 1.13 (c)(2).
Id.
Id. R. 1.13 (e).
Id.
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The ABA Model Rules only provide baseline standards of legal ethics
and professional responsibility.318 The next section examines how some
states’ rules of professional conduct, which lawyers can be held liable for
violating, are applied to in-house attorney whistleblowers.
3. State Rules of Professional Conduct and Whistleblower Protection
As discussed in Part I.C above, state laws protect whistleblowers through
whistleblower protection statutes, tort-based wrongful discharge causes of
action, or both.319 Whether or not a whistleblower is protected in a given
situation varies from state to state.320 Furthermore, there are state
variations in attorney-client confidentiality rules as well. For example,
under New York’s version of Rule 1.6, lawyers are permitted—but not
required—to disclose confidential client information in order to prevent a
crime.321 In contrast, the equivalent rule in New Jersey requires lawyers to
make the disclosure.322 To complicate matters further, state rules of
professional conduct can clash with other regimes governing professional
conduct, such as SEC Part 205.323 This section examines how courts have
treated the interplay between whistleblower protection and state rules of
professional conduct.
a. Attorney-Client Confidentiality
Balla v. Gambro, Inc.324 was a landmark case addressing the interplay
between whistleblower protection, under a tort-based wrongful discharge
cause of action, and attorney-client confidentiality.325 Balla, the in-house
counsel at Gambro, Inc., was dismissed after he informed his employer that
he would do “whatever necessary” to stop the sale of defective kidney
dialyzers.326 The Illinois Supreme Court held that Balla had no cause of
action under a common law wrongful termination claim.327 The court
reasoned that allowing in-house attorneys to pursue wrongful termination
claims would compromise the attorney-client privilege.328 According to the
court, “In-house counsel do not have a choice of whether to follow their
ethical obligations as attorneys licensed to practice law, or follow the illegal
and unethical demands of their clients. In-house counsel must abide by the

318. See supra note 297 and accompanying text.
319. See supra Part I.C.
320. See supra Part I.C.
321. N.Y. JOINT APPELLATE RULES GOVERNING ATTORNEYS R. 1.6(b)(2) (2014); see also
Temkin & Moskovits, supra note 297, at 16.
322. N.J. CT. R. 1.6(b); see also Temkin & Moskovits, supra note 297, at 16.
323. See infra Part II.B.
324. 584 N.E.2d 104 (Ill. 1991).
325. Id.; see also Lobel, supra note 284, at 1257–60.
326. Balla, 584 N.E.2d at 106. Balla was concerned that the dialyzers could cause death
or serious bodily harm to patients who used them. Id. at 107.
327. Id. at 113.
328. Id. at 111.
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Rules of Professional Conduct.”329 Looking to Rule 1.6 of the Illinois
Rules of Professional Conduct,330 the court stated that Balla had a duty to
report the confidential information because the client was about to commit
an act that would result in death or serious bodily injury.331 At the same
time, the court held that in-house counsel should not be protected by
wrongful discharge claims, as this would “have a chilling effect on the
communications between the employer/client and the in-house counsel.”332
Thus, according to the court, Balla was required to report the confidential
information even if he lost his job as a result of the disclosure, but he was
not entitled to wrongful discharge protection as an in-house attorney.333
In contrast, in General Dynamics Corp. v. Superior Court,334 the
California Supreme Court allowed an in-house attorney to proceed with a
wrongful termination cause of action, finding that there was no particular
reason to prevent the claim as long as it could be established without
breaching the attorney-client privilege.335 Thus, if the lawyer could prove
his claim without violating attorney-client privilege, he could have a valid
wrongful discharge cause of action.336
In Willy v. Coastal Corp.,337 an in-house lawyer brought a wrongful
discharge action against his former employer.338 Willy claimed that he was
dismissed for insisting that his employer comply with state and federal
environmental and securities laws.339 The Southern District of Texas
dismissed the claim340 because of the state’s code of professional
responsibility.341 The court held that, under the state rules, if an attorney
believes his client is pursuing an illegal act, he or she may “voluntarily
withdraw” from representation.342 Should the attorney choose not to
withdraw “and not to follow the client’s wishes, he should not be surprised
that his client no longer desires his services.”343 However, if the client
chose not to end the relationship, the attorney would then be required to
withdraw representation.344 The court also saw no reason to distinguish
between in-house and outside counsel in this regard.345
329. Id. at 109.
330. ILL. SUP. CT. R. 1.6(b).
331. Balla, 584 N.E.2d at 109.
332. Id. at 110.
333. Id. at 109.
334. 876 P.2d 487 (Cal. 1994).
335. Id. at 490.
336. Id.
337. 647 F. Supp. 116, 117 (S.D. Tex. 1986), rev’d on other grounds, 855 F.2d 1160 (5th
Cir. 1988).
338. Id.
339. Id.
340. Id. at 119.
341. Id. at 118.
342. Id.
343. Id.
344. Id.
345. Id. at 118–19. While outside counsel may withdraw representation from a client, inhouse counsel are effectively giving up their jobs when they do so.
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The manner in which courts vary in their application of state rules
governing attorney-client confidentiality is one factor that in-house attorney
whistleblowers must take into account when deciding whether to disclose
information. Another factor that these whistleblowers must consider is the
job duty exception.
b. The Job Duty Exception
In Kidwell v. Sybaritic, Inc., the Minnesota Supreme Court confronted
the job duty exception.346 Brian Kidwell was the in-house counsel for
Sybaritic, Inc. when he sent an email entitled “A Difficult Duty” to the
management team.347 In the email, Kidwell expressed concern regarding
the organization’s “pervasive culture of dishonesty,”348 identified specific
violations,349 and indicated that if the organization did not react
appropriately to the allegations, he would alert the “appropriate
authorities.”350 Additionally, Kidwell discussed the situation with, and sent
a copy of the email to, his father, although the management team was not
aware of this at the time.351
The day after he sent the email, the management team met with Kidwell
to discuss the issues he had addressed.352 Although the team created a plan
to resolve these issues, Kidwell was discharged a few weeks later.353
According to Sybaritic, Kidwell was terminated because of a series of
difficulties that made the organization unable to trust him, particularly after
becoming aware that Kidwell had sent the email to his father.354 Kidwell,
however, filed suit against the organization claiming that they had retaliated
against him in violation of the state’s whistleblower statute.355
Kidwell prevailed in the District Court of Minnesota.356 The Minnesota
Court of Appeals, however, held that “an employee does not engage in
protected conduct under the whistleblower act if the employee makes a
report in fulfillment of the duties of his or her job.”357 Since Kidwell’s
email was sent in the scope of his job and not with the intent to disclose
misconduct, the court concluded, it was not protected under the state’s
whistleblower protection statute.358
346. Kidwell v. Sybaritic, Inc., 784 N.W.2d 220 (Minn. 2010) (plurality opinion).
347. Id. at 221.
348. Id. at 222.
349. Id.
350. Id. at 223.
351. Id.
352. Id.
353. Id. at 224.
354. Id.
355. Id. at 221.
356. Id. at 225; see also Kidwell v. Sybaritic, Inc., No. 05-13989, 2007 WL 1303946
(Minn. Dist. Ct. Feb. 2, 2007), rev’d, 749 N.W.2d 855, 866 (Minn. Ct. App. 2008), aff’d,
784 N.W.2d 220.
357. Kidwell, 749 N.W.2d at 866 (citing Grundtner v. Univ. of Minn., 730 N.W.2d 323
(Minn. Ct. App. 2007)).
358. Id. at 869–70.
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The Minnesota Supreme Court also denied Kidwell’s claim but for
different reasons.359 The opinion explicitly rejected the appellate judges’
view that the state whistleblower statute created a blanket exception for
disclosures made in the scope of job duties.360 Yet, the Supreme Court
decided the case on very similar grounds: the majority opinion stated that
“an employee who ‘has, as part of his normal duties, been assigned the task
of investigating and reporting wrongdoing . . . and, in fact, reports that
wrongdoing through normal channels’ is not engaging in protected conduct
. . . .”361 In this case, because Kidwell’s intent in sending the email was to
advise his client, and not to blow the whistle, the state whistleblower statute
did not protect his disclosure.362 Effectively, there was no protection for
Kidwell “specifically because his actions directly carried out his job duties,
despite the plurality’s alleged denial of any such exception.”363
According to the plurality, however, “only in a very rare case would an
employee who is responsible for reporting illegal conduct and who reports
such conduct through normal channels, be able to prove that the report was
made for the purpose of exposing an illegality.”364
Ultimately, the outcome of the case hinged on a concurring opinion,
which was analyzed on completely different grounds.365 Instead of job
duties, the concurrence focused on traditional notions of client
confidentiality.366 “[W]hen a lawyer breaches his or her fiduciary duty to
the client, the client has an absolute right to terminate the attorney-client
relationship.”367 Even though the state whistleblower protection statute
provided no such exception, the concurring opinion stressed that “the
statute does not trump [the court’s] power and responsibility to regulate the
bar, particularly in matters of ethics.”368 Therefore, according to the
concurring opinion in Kidwell, the confidentiality requirements surrounding
attorney-client relationships preempt the protection provided to attorney
whistleblowers by applicable whistleblower protection statutes.369
In addition to state rules of professional responsibility, in-house attorney
whistleblowers who wish to disclose federal securities violations must
consider special rules that apply to attorneys who appear before the SEC.

359. Kidwell, 784 N.W.2d at 226, 230–31.
360. Id. at 226.
361. Id. at 228 (quoting Huffman v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 263 F.3d 1341, 1352 (Fed.
Cir. 2001)).
362. Id. at 228–29; see also Banick, supra note 28, at 1891.
363. Banick, supra note 28, at 1894 (citing FREDERICK T. GOLDER & DAVID R. GOLDER,
LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW: COMPLIANCE AND LITIGATION § 1:149 (3d ed. 2010)).
364. Kidwell, 784 N.W.2d at 238–39 (Anderson, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
365. Banick, supra note 28, at 1892.
366. Id.; see also Kidwell, 784 N.W.2d at 233 (Magnuson, C.J., concurring).
367. Kidwell, 784 N.W.2d at 233.
368. Id.
369. Id.; see also Banick, supra note 28, at 1892.
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4. The SEC’s Attorney Conduct Rules: Part 205
In 2003, pursuant to SOX, the SEC promulgated Rule 205,370 which sets
standards for attorney professional responsibility.371 These rules, also
referred to as “Part 205,”372 provide the minimum standards of professional
conduct that apply to attorneys who practice and appear before the SEC on
behalf of an issuer.373 “Appearing and practicing” is broadly defined in this
context; for example, it can include a lawyer who merely advises on U.S.
securities law with respect to a document he or she knows will be filed with
the SEC.374 Similarly, “issuer” is broadly defined and even include “any
person controlled by an issuer.”375
Under Part 205, an in-house attorney is permitted to disclose certain
confidential information (in violation of client-attorney privilege) outside of
the organization.376 However, attorneys are required first to report the
information to the company’s chief legal officer, who must in turn report up
the corporate ladder.377 Only if internal reporting fails (and reporting
would prevent harm to the corporation or to the investors) may the attorney
disclose confidential client information outside the organization.378 Thus,
in order to comply with SOX and its whistleblower protection provisions,
attorneys must first report any suspected wrongdoing internally.379
Part 205 does not require lawyers to report violations to the SEC or to
any other external organization.380 It does, however, permit attorneys to
disclose confidential information—without the consent of the issuer or
client—when reporting violations to the SEC in three circumstances.381
The lawyer can report out to the SEC if he or she believes disclosure is
necessary to: (1) prevent the issuer from committing a violation that is
likely to cause substantial injury to either the financial interest or property
of the issuer or the investors; (2) prevent the issuer from committing perjury
or perpetrating a fraud in a Commission investigation or administrative
proceeding; or (3) rectify the consequences of a violation by the issuer that
has caused or may cause substantial injury to either the financial interest or

370. 17 C.F.R. pt. 205 (2014).
371. See Temkin & Moskovits, supra note 297, at 14.
372. See Attorneys As SEC Whistleblowers, supra note 306, at 5.
373. Id. Attorneys who appear before the SEC and are found in violation of Part 205 can
be sanctioned by the SEC. 17 C.F.R. § 205.6.
374. Attorneys As SEC Whistleblowers, supra note 306, at 5.
375. Id. Part 205 refers to section 3 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange
Act) to define the term “issuer.” See 17 C.F.R. § 205.2(h). Under the Exchange Act, “any
person who issues or proposes to issue any security” is an issuer. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(8)
(2012).
376. Temkin & Moskovits, supra note 297, at 14.
377. Id.
378. Id.
379. Id.
380. Attorneys As SEC Whistleblowers, supra note 306, at 5.
381. Id.
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property of the issuer or the investors, for which the lawyer’s services were
used.382
Thus, Part 205 allows—in limited circumstances—for attorneys to
disclose confidential client information to the SEC without the client’s
consent, and thereby to qualify as protected whistleblowers.383
5. How Attorneys Are Expected To Act Under SOX
As discussed above, Part 205 mandates that under SOX, while attorneys
are required initially to report federal securities violations internally,384
they are later permitted to disclose information to the SEC in order to
prevent “a material violation that is likely to cause substantial injury to the
financial interest or property of the issuer or investors.”385 Therefore, under
SOX, attorneys are required to “report up” but have no obligation to “report
out.”386
In Van Asdale v. International Game Technology, the plaintiffs were inhouse attorneys that sued their former employer under the SOX
antiretaliation provisions.387 The organization, a publicly traded slot
machine distributor, was in the process of merging with another
company.388 The in-house counsel discovered that one of the acquired
company’s major assets was tied in a patent infringement claim and that the
underlying patent was probably invalid.389 They also found that the highranking officers in the acquired company may have known about the
invalidity of the patent and therefore that the public disclosure about the
upcoming merger was potentially misleading.390 The attorneys brought
these issues to the attention of their employer and were fired shortly
thereafter.391
Because this kind of misleading public disclosure can fall under
securities fraud, the attorneys filed a wrongful discharge suit under SOX.392
Their former employer moved to dismiss the case on grounds that the
attorneys could not prove their case without breaching attorney-client
confidentiality.393 The Ninth Circuit noted, however, that because there is
nothing in SOX to indicate “that in-house attorneys are not also protected
from retaliation under this section,” a lawyer that reports misconduct and
experiences retaliation may bring a claim under SOX.394 The court
382.
383.
384.
385.
386.
387.
388.
389.
390.
391.
392.
393.
394.

Id.
Id.
See Temkin & Moskovits, supra note 297, at 14.
17 C.F.R. § 205.3(d)(2) (2014).
See Temkin & Moskovits, supra note 297, at 14.
Van Asdale v. Int’l Game Tech., 577 F.3d 989, 992 (9th Cir. 2009).
Id. at 991–92.
Id. at 992–93.
Id.
Id. at 993.
Id. at 994.
Id. at 994–95.
Id. at 996.
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reasoned that by taking precautions to balance the attorneys’ claim against
the company’s right to preserve confidentiality, the case could proceed.395
6. How Attorneys Are Expected To Act Under the Dodd-Frank Act
As described above, for in-house attorneys who decide to report
misconduct, SOX and Part 205 generally require them to report information
internally as a first step in order to be protected by the whistleblower
antiretaliation provisions.396 Similarly, courts have extended antiretaliation
protection to whistleblowers who report misconduct internally under the
Dodd-Frank Act.397
The Fifth Circuit’s recent ruling in Asadi, however, requires the
opposite.398 The court in Asadi held that whistleblowers must report
misconduct externally and directly to the SEC in order to be protected
under the Dodd-Frank Act.399 As a result of the Fifth Circuit’s decision
(and existing opposing case law from district courts in three other
circuits),400 the interpretation of the Dodd-Frank Act’s whistleblower
protection regime, and particularly its antiretaliation provisions, is ripe for a
circuit split. This creates uncertainty over the extent of protection the
Dodd-Frank Act provides to employees who report violations of federal
securities law internally or to other government entities rather than directly
to the SEC.
Moreover, under the Fifth Circuit’s interpretation, attorneys who choose
to report misconduct may find it particularly difficult to act in compliance
with both the Dodd-Frank Act and other governing regimes. By only
extending antiretaliation protection to whistleblowers who report first and
directly to the SEC, the Fifth Circuit ruling has created a conflict between
how lawyers must act under the Dodd-Frank Act as opposed to SOX and
Part 205.401 This means that attorney whistleblowers who act in
compliance with SOX and Part 205, and make an internal report, may find
themselves without recourse for retaliation under the Dodd-Frank Act.402
Although lawyers may still bring an antiretaliation claim under SOX, they

395. Id. at 995–96. This is in direct contrast with Balla, where the court held that inhouse attorneys could not bring a wrongful discharge claim even if they were required to
report wrongdoing externally. See supra notes 324–33 and accompanying text.
396. See supra notes 337–79 and accompanying text.
397. See supra notes 228–47 and accompanying text.
398. See supra notes 248–53 and accompanying text.
399. See supra notes 248–53 and accompanying text.
400. See supra note 219 and accompanying text.
401. Under SOX and Part 205, attorneys are first required to report misconduct internally,
whereas the Fifth Circuit ruling requires attorneys to report to the SEC in order to be
afforded whistleblower protection under Dodd-Frank. See supra notes 248–53, 384–86 and
accompanying text.
402. The court in Asadi did not provide the plaintiff anti-retaliation protection under
Dodd-Frank, because he first reported the misconduct internally. See supra notes 248–53 and
accompanying text.
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will need to consider shorter statutory periods and restrictions on where the
claim can be brought.403
II. UP OR OUT? STATE OR FEDERAL LAWS? THE DILEMMA ATTORNEY
WHISTLEBLOWERS FACE IN CHOOSING WHERE TO REPORT
As described in Part I, various different laws govern the protections
available to whistleblowers in general and attorney whistleblowers in
particular. These different laws not only provide different levels of
protection, but may require different responses by the whistleblower in
order for him or her to be eligible for protection. This is especially true for
attorney whistleblowers.404 With this in mind, the next Part explores how
the different laws interact with each other, and when a given law applies
over another.
A. Internal Reporting, External Reporting, and a Flexible Middle Ground
A recurring issue—for whistleblowers in general and attorney
whistleblowers in particular—is whether to report misconduct internally or
externally. Part II.A discusses some of the advantages and disadvantages of
required internal and external reporting, as well as a flexible approach.
Because whistleblower protections have developed as somewhat of a
patchwork, they vary in their scope and application, particularly with
respect to reporting requirements.405 Most whistleblower protections under
state statutes and common law tend to protect only external reporting,
whereas federal whistleblower protections also include internal reporting.406
Because the starting point for whether or not different regimes protect
attorney whistleblowers is often where they report wrongdoing, this section
provides some justifications for each side.
Studies show that whistleblowers choose where to report—either
internally or externally—based on a wide variety of factors.407 These
include the whistleblower’s status in the organization, the status of the
alleged wrongdoer, organizational culture, and how significant the
misconduct is.408 For example, whistleblowers may seek to report
wrongdoing internally if their aim is to stop a colleague’s unlawful activity,
whereas they may report externally if they are motivated by a desire to stop
large-scale organizational misconduct or to protect public welfare.409
Some regimes require whistleblowers in general—and attorney
whistleblowers in particular—to report violations internally in order to be
403. See supra notes 209–13 and accompanying text.
404. See supra Part I.D.
405. Lobel, supra note 284, at 1249.
406. Id. at 1249–50.
407. Elletta Sangrey Callahan & Terry Morehead Dworkin, Who Blows the Whistle to the
Media, and Why: Organizational Characteristics of Media Whistleblowers, 32 AM. BUS.
L.J. 151, 162–63 (1994).
408. Id.
409. Campbell, supra note 26, at 570.
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protected.410 Proponents of internal reporting point out that it provides
employers with an opportunity to rectify the violation before authorities are
involved.411 Internal reporting can help maintain the “corporate chain of
command,” avoid negative publicity, and promote employee loyalty.412
Moreover, it may be more efficient for employers, rather than governmental
bodies, to try and rectify the problem.413
With respect to the
whistleblower’s own preferences, employees tend to prefer to report
violations internally first.414
Opponents argue that internal reporting requirements lead to cover-ups
and retaliation by employers.415
Additionally, in some situations,
employees may prefer to report externally; for example, when the
whistleblower’s supervisor is involved in the misconduct, when the
employer has ignored other complaints, or when the organizational culture
does not allow dissent.416
Some regimes, on the other hand, require external reporting in order for a
whistleblower to be protected.417 Supporters of external reporting point out
that violations should be publicized and investigated to ensure compliance
with the law.418 Some argue that involving authorities reduces the cost of
investigation.419 Finally, in cases where the violation is criminal,
proponents argue that external reporting allows for the quick involvement
of the criminal justice system, which is necessary for deterrence and
retribution purposes.420

410. Examples of such regimes include the rules applicable to attorneys under SOX and
Part 205. See supra Part I.D.4.
411. Sinzdak, supra note 118, at 1654; see also Campbell, supra note 26, at 570 (“For
this reason, consumer protection activist Ralph Nader believes that ‘[f]ormal channels for
bringing a situation to the attention of top management should be pursued first,’ to offer
companies an opportunity to investigate illegalities and remedy situations before financial
and reputational damage occurs from outside exposure.” (alteration in original)).
412. Sinzdak, supra note 118, at 1654; see also David Culp, Whistleblowers: Corporate
Anarchists or Heroes? Towards a Judicial Perspective, 13 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 109, 133–34
(1995); Laura Simoff, Confusion and Deterrence: The Problems that Arise from a
Deficiency in Uniform Laws and Procedures for Environmental “Whistleblowers,” 8 DICK.
J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 325, 338–39 (1999).
413. Sinzdak, supra note 118, at 1655.
414. Id. at 1652 n.162 (“[W]histleblowers typically disclose their concerns externally
only after they have received no corrective response internally, and only after much
agonizing” (quoting John A. Gray, The Scope of Whistleblower Protection in the State of
Maryland: A Comprehensive Statute Is Needed, 33 U. BALT. L. REV. 225, 226–27 (2004))
(internal quotation mark omitted)).
415. Id. at 1655.
416. Id. Additionally, as discussed above, whistleblowers may prefer to report externally
because they are motivated by a desire to stop large-scale organizational misconduct rather
than to stop one colleague’s behavior. See supra notes 48–50 and accompanying text.
417. An example of this is the Fifth Circuit’s interpretation of the Dodd-Frank Act
antiretaliation provisions in Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA), L.L.C., 720 F.3d 620 (5th Cir.
2013). See supra Part I.B.3.
418. See Sinzdak, supra note 118, at 1651.
419. Id.
420. Id.
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Those who challenge external reporting requirements say that it ignores a
practical reality: whistleblowers generally tend to report internally first.421
Additionally, opponents argue that not all violations deserve the public’s
attention, time, and money, and internal reporting is therefore more
efficient.422 For example, “incompetent or inadequately performing
employees” may forgo the opportunity to make an internal report in order to
make a premature external report so that they can “attain celebrity” or
receive an award.423 Moreover, critics argue that because organizations
will not be given the opportunity to investigate the allegations, false or
inaccurate reports may increase.424 External reporting requirements can
also cause organizations to mistrust their employees, undermining the
“mutually beneficial reliance” in an employer-employee relationship.425
Finally, opponents argue that external reporting requirements can shift
some of the regulatory burden from desirable regulators—such as elected
and appointed government officials—to employees, who may be ill
prepared or have questionable motives.426
Internal reporting has traditionally been considered more culturally
acceptable than external reporting.427 However, there has been a gradual
shift in the public’s opinion of whistleblowers that report wrongdoing
externally.428
Historically, whistleblowers who reported misconduct
externally were perceived to threaten an organization’s “structure,
cohesiveness, and public image,” which in turn threatened societal
prosperity.429 Whistleblowers’ motivations were questioned, and they were
thought to violate the cultural notion of employer-employee loyalty.430
Furthermore, it was thought that external whistleblowing was not necessary
to deter misconduct.431
However, a “cultural shift from reverence to distrust of large companies”
starting in the second half of the twentieth century led to a corresponding
change in the public perception of whistleblowers who expose corporate
421. Id. at 1652 (citing Gray, supra note 414, at 226–27; Terry Morehead Dworkin &
Elletta Sangrey Callahan, Internal Whistleblowing: Protecting the Interests of the Employee,
the Organization, and Society, 29 AM. BUS. L.J. 267, 281 n.71 (1991)).
422. Id. at 1654.
423. Campbell, supra note 26, at 595–96.
424. Id. at 596 (citing WHISTLEBLOWING: IN DEFENSE OF PROPER ACTION 53 (Marek
Arszulowicz & Wojciech W. Gasparski eds., 2011); Ebersole, supra note 35, at 127; The
Dodd-Frank Whistleblower Provisions: Considerations for Effectively Preparing for and
Responding to Whistleblowers, CLIENTS & FRIENDS MEMO (Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft
LLP, New York, N.Y.), May 26, 2011, at 2, available at http://www.cadwalader.com/
uploads/cfmemos/80b476693cd5c2e25ea0246747b6ef36.pdf).
425. Id.
426. Id. at 596–97.
427. Id. at 570.
428. Id.
429. Id. at 570–71 (internal quotation mark omitted).
430. Id. at 571–72.
431. Id. at 573 (“Even recently, the indispensability of external whistleblowing has been
doubted by then-Representative Johnny Isakson when he stated, ‘I would submit to my
colleague it would not have taken a whistle-blower at Enron to blow it sky high.’”).
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wrongdoing, particularly externally.432 Over time, notions of employeremployee loyalty started to change, encouraging loyalty toward other
individuals who work for the organization rather than to the organization
itself.433 Moreover, mistrust of whistleblowers and their motives decreased
as mistrust of large corporations and their motives increased.434 External
reporting, which was once doubted and thought unnecessary, started to be
viewed as not only necessary, but also essential.435 The law developed to
accommodate this cultural shift: whistleblower statutes have also evolved
to accept or even promote external reporting.436
While these cultural changes have led to an acceptance of external
reporting alongside internal reporting, a third approach proposes a flexible
standard towards reporting requirements.437 This approach suggests that
whistleblower laws should allow flexibility on where whistleblowers should
report violations and protect them regardless of whether they report
internally or externally.438 Under this approach, whistleblowers who may
be misinformed or uneducated about where they should report, but who
have acted in good faith, are not penalized for their attempts to uncover
misconduct.439
A flexible approach to reporting requirements may protect a wider range
of whistleblowers and their different situations.440 Such an approach could
potentially encourage whistleblowers to come forward, by counterbalancing
the confusion produced by different requirements under different laws.441
Since some whistleblowers can be deterred by the uncertainty of whether or
not they will be protected, this approach could help diminish such an effect
by offering greater protection.442
However, a flexible approach to reporting can have two major
drawbacks.443 First, since it provides whistleblowers with the freedom of
deciding where to report, whistleblowers may decide to report to a
suboptimal party.444 There may be certain inherent advantages to reporting
to a particular entity, and since a flexible approach does not incentivize
whistleblowers to report to any particular party, they may choose a less
desirable route.445
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Id. at 573–74.
Id. at 575.
Id. at 575–76.
Id. at 576.
Id. at 579–30.
Sinzdak, supra note 118, at 1660–61.
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Id. at 1661–62.
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Id. at 1663.
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A second drawback to a flexible approach is that it may undesirably
increase the number of whistleblower lawsuits or prolong existing suits.446
With a flexible approach to reporting requirements, cases are less likely to
be dismissed at an early stage for failing to meet the standards required for
protection.447
These justifications—for internal reporting, external reporting, and a
flexible approach—are important for an attorney whistleblower because
they can determine whether he or she is protected against retaliation.
B. State Laws Versus Federal Laws
As explored in Part I.D, in-house attorney whistleblowers that report
federal securities violations are subject to various regimes and can be
expected to act differently under each one. This section discusses the
choice of law issues that can determine which regime is applicable.
1. Choice of Law: State Versus State
Putting aside the issue of whether or not federal law preempts state law
via Part 205,448 attorneys may still have to consider choice-of-law issues
with respect to different states. Whether or not a particular situation
permits or even requires an attorney to report a violation externally depends
on what jurisdiction he or she is operating in.449 Moreover, some lawyers
may be licensed to practice in different jurisdictions, and a lawyer’s conduct
may even “involve significant contacts with more than one jurisdiction.”450
ABA Model Rule 8.5 addresses these issues.451 The first part of this rule
provides that lawyers are subject to the disciplinary authority of both the
jurisdiction in which they are licensed, and the jurisdiction in which they
provide or offer services (whether or not they are licensed in that
jurisdiction).452 The second part addresses choice of law issues.453
According to this second part, the professional rules of the jurisdiction in
which a tribunal sits will govern matters pending before the tribunal, unless
the tribunal provides otherwise.454 For other matters, the lawyer is subject
to the professional rules of the jurisdiction in which the underlying conduct
occurred, or where the predominant effect of the conduct was.455
Interestingly, if a lawyer “reasonably believes” the predominant effect of
446. Id.
447. Id.
448. See infra Part II.B.2.
449. For example, lawyers in New York are permitted to break attorney-client
confidentiality to prevent a crime, whereas lawyers in New Jersey are required to do so. See
supra notes 321–22 and accompanying text; see also Attorneys As SEC Whistleblowers,
supra note 306, at 17.
450. Attorneys As SEC Whistleblowers, supra note 306, at 17.
451. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.5 (2013).
452. Id. R. 8.5(a).
453. Id. R. 8.5(b).
454. Id.
455. Id.
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his or her conduct occurs in a particular jurisdiction, and the conduct in
question conforms to the rules of that jurisdiction, the lawyer will not be
subject to discipline.456
Although ABA Model Rule 8.5 aims to provide some guidance in this
area, in practice the Rule is complex and can be uncertain in application.457
Furthermore, not all states have adopted it: as of May 2013, twenty-seven
states had adopted the most recent version, nine states had adopted a
modified version, two states still used an earlier version, one state used a
modified version of an earlier rule, and twelve states had adopted no
version of the rule at all.458 Therefore, despite the existence of ABA Model
Rule 8.5, there can still be a significant lack of clarity as to which state’s
professional rules apply to an attorney whistleblower.
2. Choice of Law: Federal Versus State
In order to provide attorneys with the whistleblower protections of the
Dodd-Frank Act and SOX, the SEC must examine his or her conduct under
their professional rules as provided by Part 205.459 However, the
appropriate response by an attorney to a potential violation may differ under
Part 205 and a given state’s own professional rules: for example, while Part
205 may permit the disclosure of confidential information to the SEC
without the client’s consent, it is possible that the state in the attorney’s
jurisdiction may prohibit such disclosure.460 Thus, an attorney must
consider whether federal or state law applies in order to determine not only
the whistleblower protections available but also whether or not he or she
will be at risk of professional disciplinary action for disclosing confidential
information.461
Part 205 only applies to attorneys who appear or practice before the SEC
on behalf of an issuer.462 Therefore, this conflict (between federal and state
professional rules) in the context of attorney whistleblowers of federal
securities violations only applies to attorneys who appear or practice before
the SEC in representation of an issuer.463
Since Part 205 sets forth “minimum standards of professional conduct,” it
acts as a “one-way ratchet in favor of disclosure without client consent.”464
456. Id.
457. Attorneys As SEC Whistleblowers, supra note 306, at 17.
458. Id.
459. See supra notes 370–83 and accompanying text.
460. The Southern District of Texas dismissed the in-house lawyer’s antiretaliation claim
in Willy v. Coastal Corp. because the state’s code of professional responsibility prohibited
such disclosures. See supra notes 337–45 and accompanying text.
461. Since attorneys are licensed and regulated by states, they must account for the state
ethics rules even if they are considering federal claims. See infra note 295 and
accompanying text.
462. See supra notes 372–75 and accompanying text.
463. See supra notes 372–75 and accompanying text. Since Part 205 only applies to this
category of attorneys, other attorneys will only need to consider state professional rules.
464. Attorneys As SEC Whistleblowers, supra note 306, at 6.
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Thus, if the state professional rules in a jurisdiction forbid disclosure of
confidential client information to external organizations, but Part 205
permits disclosure—for example, where the attorney reasonably believes
that the client is a continuing bad actor—the SEC claims that Part 205
governs, and disclosure is permitted.465 In situations where a jurisdiction
requires the lawyer to disclose the confidential information pertaining to a
violation,466 however, state rules will govern and Part 205 will take a back
seat.467 Therefore, the attorney will be required to disclose the confidential
information.468 Of course, in a situation where neither Part 205 nor the
state permits disclosure of confidential client information, the lawyer will
be prohibited from doing so and cannot seek whistleblower protection.469
The SEC claims that, if necessary, Part 205 will trump state professional
rules as the minimum standard for professional conduct. However this
issue is far from settled, and several state associations have publicly voiced
their disagreement.
The first state challenge to the SEC’s rules for attorney conduct came
from the Washington State Bar Association (WSBA) less than six months
after Part 205 was adopted.470 The WSBA issued a proposed interim
opinion disagreeing with the SEC’s claim that Part 205 preempted state
ethics rules.471 The SEC’s general counsel responded with a comment
letter that, among other things, pointed out that the WSBA’s position was
“inconsistent with prevailing Supreme Court precedent. The Court has
consistently upheld the authority of federal agencies to implement rules of
conduct that diverge from and supersede state laws that address the same
conduct.”472 Nevertheless, the WSBA adopted the interim opinion.473
The State Bar of California, which has the strictest attorney
confidentiality rules of all the states,474 also wrote a letter to the SEC during
the same time period.475 The letter stated that it was unclear whether the
SEC had the authority to promulgate rules that preempted states rules, and
that the State Bar of California did not have the power to refuse to enforce
state statutes “on the basis of federal preemption unless an appellate court
has so ruled.”476 In 2004, the association followed up with a letter stating
465. Id. at 7.
466. For example, professional conduct rules in New Jersey require an attorney to
disclose information to stop a crime. See supra note 322 and accompanying text.
467. Attorneys As SEC Whistleblowers, supra note 306, at 7.
468. Id.
469. Id. at 6.
470. Will Award-Seeking Whistleblower Lawyers Be Caught Between Conflicting SEC
and State Ethics Rules? CLIENT ALERT (Latham & Watkins LLP, New York, N.Y.), Oct. 21,
2013, at 3, available at http://www.lw.com/thoughtLeadership/SEC-whistleblower-ethicsconflict.
471. Id.
472. Id.
473. Id. at 4.
474. Id.
475. Id.
476. Id.
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that “California attorneys disclosing client confidences to the SEC could
potentially be subject to State Bar discipline and/or breach of fiduciary duty
claims. . . . California attorneys cannot presume there is a safe harbor if
they disclose client confidences to the SEC.”477
The SEC’s general counsel reiterated the SEC’s position in an April 2004
speech, stating that “where a federal rule says you may do something and a
state rule says you may not, there is a conflict and the federal rule should
prevail.”478 The general counsel went further and hinted that the SEC
would support lawyers who were caught in the tension between state rules
and Part 205.479 Eight months later, the California State Bar published a
sixty-three-page article extensively analyzing the conflict from the states’
point of view and reiterating that Part 205 does not trump California state
law.480
The Part 205 preemption issue was not widely discussed between 2004
and 2013, even though the SEC’s 2011 rules implementing the
whistleblower provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act incorporated Part 205 in
considering attorney whistleblowers.481
Then, in October 2013, New York became the third state to oppose the
SEC’s federal preemption position.482 The Committee on Professional
Ethics of the New York County Lawyers’ Association (NYCLA) issued a
formal opinion addressing the preemption issue.483 The opinion stated that
New York rules allow attorneys to disclose “confidential information in
different, more limited circumstances than the SEC rules.”484
The preemption issue is controversial because although it can be
acceptable for the SEC to sanction an attorney for unprofessional conduct in
an SEC proceeding,485 “it is quite another for the federal government to
seek to regulate attorney-client confidential communications.
The
Constitution does not give the federal government the right to license or
regulate the practice of law.”486 After all, even federal prosecutors are
subject to state rules governing professional conduct.487 Therefore, state
professional conduct rules also govern lawyers who work for the SEC.488
In light of this, it can be controversial for SEC lawyers to be bound by state
ethics rules but to allow federal securities laws to “trump” state ethics rules
477. Id.
478. Id.
479. Id.
480. Id. at 4–5; see also Corps. Comm. of the Bus. Law Section of the Cal. State Bar,
Conflicting Currents: The Obligation To Maintain Inviolate Client Confidences and the
New SEC Attorney Rules, 32 PEPP. L. REV. 89, 148–50 (2004).
481. Will Award-Seeking Whistleblower Lawyers Be Caught Between Conflicting SEC
and State Ethics Rules?, supra note 470, at 4–5.
482. Id.
483. Id.
484. Id.
485. See Temkin & Moskovits, supra note 297, at 19.
486. Id.
487. Id.
488. Id.
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governing client confidentiality in other cases.489 It is therefore not
surprising that thus far, no court has directly found that SEC regulations
preempt state ethics rules that govern attorney-client confidentiality.490
However, states vary on how deferentially they have treated SEC rules.491
And since it is the states, and not the federal government, that provide
plenary law licenses, attorneys must account for state ethics rules even if
they are considering federal claims.492
C. A Hypothetical Scenario: Which Law Should an Attorney
Whistleblower Break First?
Having discussed the various applicable issues affecting in-house
attorney whistleblowers throughout this Note, this section revisits the
hypothetical scenario posed in the Introduction.
Imagine that as the in-house counsel to a publicly traded corporation, you
have discovered that your employer is violating federal securities law and
must decide what to do next. Assume that you are licensed to practice and
have substantial contacts in both the states of Texas and New Jersey. You
practice before the SEC and believe your employer’s federal securities
violations are criminal in nature. How should you act in order to prevent
yourself from retaliation and avoid sanctions?
First, you might consider the antiretaliation protection afforded under the
Dodd-Frank Act.493 You are in Texas, and after looking at the recent Fifth
Circuit ruling in Asadi,494 you understand that you must report directly to
the SEC in order to be protected from retaliation under the Dodd-Frank
Act.495 However, the moment you do so, you have just violated SOX and
Part 205: these regimes require you to first report your findings
internally.496 In fact, you may now be facing SEC sanctions, since you
failed to make the appropriate internal disclosures.497 On top of this, you
may have just violated the Texas rules for professional conduct: under the
district court’s ruling in Willy v. Coastal Corp., you should have either
reported the violation internally or resigned.498 Therefore, you do not have
a cause of action for wrongful termination under state law,499 and in fact,
you may face state bar association sanctions or even disbarment.500
Perhaps, to avoid this situation, you choose to report the violation
internally. By doing this, you are in compliance with SOX and Part 205,
489.
490.
491.
492.
493.
494.
495.
496.
497.
498.
499.
500.

See id.
Id.
See id. at 20.
Id. at 19.
See supra notes 209–13 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 248–53 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 248–53 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 384–86 and accompanying text.
See supra note 373.
See supra notes 337–45 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 337–45 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 461, 492 and accompanying text.
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which require you to make an internal disclosure.501 However, if you are
fired, the antiretaliation provisions under Dodd-Frank Act may not protect
you.502 Additionally, although you have acted in compliance with the
Texas state rules of professional conduct, you do not have a wrongful
termination cause of action.503 Nevertheless, you are still protected by the
antiretaliation provisions in SOX and should file a claim with OSHA within
the next ninety days to benefit from protection.504
However, since you are also licensed in and have substantial contacts
with New Jersey, you may be subject to other laws and rules.505 Since
ABA Model Rule 8.5 can be uncertain in application, you are not sure what
state’s rules for professional conduct you will be held accountable to.506
Because you have now made an internal report and failed to alert the
authorities about a criminal federal securities law violation, you may have
violated the New Jersey rules for professional conduct.507 If so, you may
face sanctions and potentially be disbarred.508 On the other hand, you have
acted in accordance with the rules under Part 205, which require you to
make an initial internal report.509 Even further, you cannot be sure whether
Part 205 will trump New Jersey’s rules of professional conduct.510
This hypothetical shows the dilemma an in-house whistleblower can face
at a very basic level. Aside from the issues discussed here, a whistleblower
must also consider the nonlegal repercussions at social, professional, and
personal levels. Even without considering those factors, and as this
hypothetical example demonstrates, in-house whistleblowers can find
themselves in a situation where their decision boils down to deciding which
law or rule to violate first.
III. A STANDARDIZED EXPECTATION FOR IN-HOUSE ATTORNEY
WHISTLEBLOWERS: REPORT UP, THEN OUT
As discussed in Parts I and II, whistleblowers in general—and attorney
whistleblowers in particular—need to consider a number of different factors
under various and sometimes conflicting laws to understand whether or not
they will be protected against retaliation. The hypothetical scenario
outlined in Part II.C demonstrated how in-house attorney whistleblowers
may be in violation of at least one governing rule or law, no matter how
they act or where they report. This Part proposes that in-house attorneys
501. See supra notes 394–86 and accompanying text.
502. See supra notes 398–403 and accompanying text.
503. In Willy v. Coastal Corp., the Southern District of Texas denied antiretaliation
protection to an in-house lawyer who was fired after insisting that his employer comply with
state and federal laws. See supra notes 337–45 and accompanying text.
504. See supra notes 197, 403 and accompanying text.
505. See supra notes 449–56 and accompanying text.
506. See supra notes 457–69 and accompanying text.
507. See supra note 322 and accompanying text.
508. See supra notes 461, 492 and accompanying text.
509. See supra notes 384–86 and accompanying text.
510. See supra Part II.B.2.
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should be uniformly held to a two-tiered reporting standard, similar to the
standards proposed by SOX and Part 205.511 In-house attorneys should
be—with some qualified exceptions—required to report internally first and
permitted to report externally if the underlying violation is not resolved.512
By imposing a uniform standard, attorney whistleblowers can expose
misconduct, potentially protecting both organizational and societal welfare,
without being at risk of violating rules or laws no matter what they do.513
Whistleblowers can be valuable to both the organization and the public at
large because they help discover and expose misconduct.514
Whistleblowers should be protected because they face inherent risks for
their actions,515 and they increase efficiency by lightening the burden on
government regulators.516 Moreover, whistleblowers should be protected
for reasons related to fairness and justice.517 By virtue of their professions,
in-house attorneys are particularly likely to recognize potential
misconduct.518 In-house attorneys have the necessary legal expertise to
spot violations and are often privy to this information, because they are in
managerial roles within corporations.519 Organizations can be incentivized
to deter misconduct by taking into account the possibility that their
employees will become whistleblowers.520 Since in-house attorneys may
have better access to information and may better understand it,521
enhancing protections for attorney whistleblowers can provide a further
incentive for an organization to stop misconduct.
Whistleblowers’ motivations may affect where they will report
wrongdoing,522 and allowing attorneys to report misconduct both internally
and externally can therefore maximize the benefits of whistleblower
protection discussed above. Although whistleblowers may generally wish
to report internally,523 they may sometimes prefer to report externally,
particularly if the underlying violation is large in scale or if it affects the
whole organization.524 Thus, requiring attorney whistleblowers to report
internally but permitting them to report externally if there is no resolution
protects them regardless of the type of violation. This can prevent a
situation where an attorney may opt to stay silent—and refrain from
exposing large-scale fraud or unlawful behavior—because he or she
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believes that nothing will be done internally and he or she will not be
protected if the report is made externally.
Requiring in-house counsel to report violations internally allows
misconduct to be investigated and perhaps rectified by the employer,525
while still allowing attorneys to abide by the attorney-client confidentiality
rules imposed by their state bar associations.526 Moreover, whistleblowers
tend to prefer to report internally,527 and whistleblowers who have a duty to
report may face less social stigma than those who report voluntarily.528
Incentivizing whistleblowers to utilize internal reporting procedures
protects the “corporate chain of command,” can avoid potentially
unnecessary and unavoidable negative publicity, and can help promote
employees’ loyalty to the organization.529 Additionally, because internal
reporting can lead to the problem being resolved without government
involvement, it can be more efficient for all parties involved. 530 This is
particularly relevant in cases involving attorney whistleblowers since they
are likely to have a better understanding of the legal repercussions of the
violation and be in the managerial position to stop it.531
Although allowing a more flexible two-tiered approach may protect a
wider range of whistleblowers,532 attorney whistleblowers are, as a group,
less likely to be misinformed or uneducated about the laws that apply to
them.533 Thus, rather than protecting whistleblowers who are confused
about where to report, this two-tiered approach—as applied to attorney
whistleblowers—can protect those who have good reason to make an
external report. As long as in-house attorneys are held to a uniform
standard across state laws, federal laws, and rules of professional conduct—
a requirement to report internally first and subsequent permission to report
externally under certain conditions—attorneys can reasonably be expected
to comply. Such an approach does not provide total freedom for where
attorneys should first report violations, which could lead them to report to a
suboptimal entity.534 As applied to attorney whistleblowers in this manner,
a two-tiered reporting approach is also unlikely to lead to an undesirable
increase in whistleblower lawsuits,535 since they will be required to follow
the procedure of first reporting internally and then considering reporting
externally. It is thus reasonable, if not desirable, to allow attorneys the
flexibility to use external reporting channels if they are unsuccessful with
their initial internal reporting attempts.
525.
526.
527.
528.
529.
530.
531.
532.
533.
534.
535.

See supra notes 411–14 and accompanying text.
See supra Part I.D.3.
See supra notes 414, 421 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 66–70 and accompanying text.
See supra note 412 and accompanying text.
See supra note 413 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 281–90 and accompanying text.
See supra note 440 and accompanying text.
See supra note 441 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 441–45 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 446–47 and accompanying text.

2014]

CHOOSING WHICH RULE TO BREAK FIRST

3393

Permitting external reporting under certain conditions, and as a last
resort,536 ensures that violations that are not rectified are eventually
publicized and brought to the attention of the proper authorities.537 While
supporters of external reporting say that illegal activity should be publicized
in order to ensure compliance,538 a two-tiered approach may provide the
benefit of governmental involvement for larger, more important violations
that the organization was not able to stop after the initial internal report. In
such a situation, permitting attorneys to report misconduct externally will
allow involvement of the criminal justice system, which may be necessary
in some cases and can fulfill deterrence and retributive purposes.539
Although some state bar associations already include similar exceptions that
allow external reporting in their attorney-client confidentiality rules,540 a
uniform approach would allow attorneys more freedom to bring potentially
massive federal securities fraud to light, while avoiding the erosion of the
attorney-client privilege. Cultural and statutory attitudes to whistleblower
reporting have changed over time, from accepting only internal reporting to
also accepting and even encouraging external reporting.541 Laws and rules
governing attorney whistleblowers should follow this trend while taking
into account attorney-client confidentiality by requiring an initial internal
report and permitting later external recourse if necessary.
CONCLUSION
The massive financial fraud and whistleblower scandals in recent history
have led to widespread and devastating financial crises. The dramatic and
sometimes unsuccessful experiences of whistleblowers in some of the
notable cases demonstrate that whistleblowers should be encouraged to
report misconduct and protected from retaliation when they do so. In-house
attorneys, in particular, may be in the best position to uncover fraud.
However, the current whistleblower protection legal landscape has evolved
as a patchwork of laws. In-house attorneys have to navigate a complex web
of governing regimes and may find themselves in violation of at least one
law no matter what they do. A uniform approach to reporting standards can
resolve this conflict. In-house attorney whistleblowers should be required
to report federal securities violations internally first, and permitted to report
them externally if they are not resolved. Requiring in-house attorneys to
report misconduct internally allows organizations the chance to rectify
potentially devastating federal securities violations, while allowing the
attorney-client privilege to be maintained. Finally, permitting external
reporting as a last resort allows in-house counsel to involve the proper
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authorities when the employer is unwilling or unable to rectify the
violation.

